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# China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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8 APRIL 1987

CHINA REPORT  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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## HUAN XIANG DISCUSSES WORLD SITUATION

Beijing XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXI [CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] in Chinese  
No 1, 20 Jan 87 pp 1-4

[Article by Huan Xiang [1360 6763]: "East-West Tension and World Economic Prospects"; first paragraph is source-supplied introduction]

[Text] Editor's note: This is excerpted from the speech delivered by Comrade Huan Xiang at the "Seminar on the International Political Environment and China's Modernization in the Latter Half of the 1980's." The seminar took place on 27 July 1985 and was organized by the Research Institute on Contemporary International Relations. The excerpt is based on notes taken at the seminar and has been reviewed by the author. We added the title.

1. Let me appraise the current situation. Tension comes from two sources. One is East-West relations, that is, relations between the two superpowers. The other is economic friction within the capitalist world. What are the prospects for the next 5 years?

First, tension in East-West relations. East-West relations were strained last year. Now that the two parties have sat down to talk, things have eased slightly. In essence, though, the tension has not been eliminated. What is the outlook? I think the key will be what happens in 1987.

After he began his second term, Reagan put forward the "Star Wars" program. The economic basis for the program is quite shaky. In the wake of the economic recovery in 1983, many U.S. economists thought the worst was over and predicted no major setbacks ahead. Reagan is fully confident that the U.S. economy will continue to expand and be able to pay for increases in military spending. Although military expenditures have been soaring, he does not want inflation. Under these circumstances, he has no choice but to attract massive amounts of foreign capital, leading to high interest rates. The United States needs foreign capital to finance its hefty deficits. Enormous military expenditures, a colossal military budget--these have become the gravest danger for the United States today. Its combined trade and budget deficits amount to almost \$300 billion a year, possibly reaching \$400 billion within 2 years. This demonstrates that as mighty as it is, the U.S. economy cannot sustain such vast military spending and substantial social welfare expenditures. So what the U.S. government seems to be doing is waiting to see if the economy

would rebound under the new tax-increase plan. If it does, the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] would be left intact. If the present tax increase does not prove to be much of a boost, the United States may trim military spending a little but it will not stop the SDI because it must vie for supremacy with the Soviet Union. Some U.S. experts say the two houses of Congress may agree to cut military spending in the next 5 years by \$56 billion, which may help somewhat. Actually a cut of this magnitude is very limited. It seems that it will be 2 years, maybe 2 and one-half years, before the United States can find out just how much money it can devote to the military and how much to social welfare. If it discovers that it cannot support the SDI as it is, Reagan, out of general election considerations, may make some minor changes, specifically, by moderating his posture towards the Soviet Union. So we can generally expect 1987 to be a pivotal year.

As for the Soviet Union, the top priority for Mikhail Gorbachev after he came to power was also to capture military superiority. The Soviet Union wants to reform its economy in a big way because if things continue as they are, the Soviet economy will not remain viable. In order to engage in the arms race, the Soviet Union has no choice but to introduce some economic reforms to adapt to its plan to compete with the United States. That is why Gorbachev announced an economic reform program the moment he assumed the reins of power. First, there was the decision to shift from the extensive to the intensive mode of development. The substance of reform largely falls into three categories. One, reforms in the economic management system. Two, reforms in the price and planning systems. Three, scientific and technological development. The overall goal is to raise labor productivity since the Soviet Union is currently behind the United States and Japan in productivity. If it fails to bestir itself and catch up now, then its arms race with the United States and its struggle to gain superiority in space and the world economy will be doomed. The SDI program is an economic as well as a military issue. If the United States succeeds in turning SDI into reality, its economic superiority will be more and more secure. If the Soviet Union fails to catch up, it will fall behind economically as well as militarily. Both the United States and Soviet Union need to sit down together and consider how to further ease the current situation, without, of course, basically changing their positions, so that they can deploy new forces to start a new round of arms race. From this perspective, we can say that East-West relations are more relaxed this year than last, and possibly even more relaxed next year than now. In 1987, they may reach a short- and medium-term, limited compromise that does not concern anything essential. That will further ease the atmosphere. This is a possibility. Another possibility is that both countries succeed in reshuffling their economic resources at home and refuse to make concessions. Then tension will intensify in 1988, 1989, and perhaps 1990. The climate will again be as strained as it was last year. While this is not impossible, I think the first scenario is more likely in the next 5 years.

Economic and political friction within the capitalist world may increase. As far as economic friction is concerned, they have almost reached a stage where compromise is impossible since economically speaking, the United States and Western Europe are sharply at odds with one another. If the U.S. dollar drops in value in the near future, U.S. goods will be cheaper in Europe and Japan,

while European and Japanese products will become more expensive on the U.S. market. This will only exacerbate the economic conflict between the two at a time when huge amounts of capital are leaving Western Europe and Japan for the United States each year because of the latter's high interest rates, affecting the position of the Western European currencies and the Japanese yen. This is a sore point in Western Europe and Japan. Economic conflicts between the United States and Japan range across the board and are not limited to a certain area. And they are serious conflicts. The United States wants Japan to use its funds to boost domestic demand and build up its military so that Japan would not need to depend on exports for economic growth. The United States is aware that Japan relies on exports to maintain economic growth. Since most of its exports go to the United States, Japan has done much damage to that country. Now the United States is asking Japan to expand domestic demand and increase military spending. Instead of depending mainly on exports, it wants Japan to rely more on domestic and military demands.

2. The development of the world economic situation. It seems that in the next 5 to 10 years, no big boom is likely in the capitalist world, while a cyclical crisis may recur, from which the West, however, may recover. There will be no serious recession and no major boom. The U.S. economy will grow at an average annual rate of 3 percent, but it is possible that it may expand at just 2 percent for 1 or 2 years. Such a slowdown, would in turn, make possible an annual growth rate of 4 percent for a couple of years. As for Europe, a 2 to 3 percent growth rate is considered quite remarkable. In the next 5 years, the European economy may hover around 2 percent. After 5 years, Europe may develop new technology and replace its inward orientation with an export orientation. Right now 70 to 75 percent of Europe's trade takes place within the Common Market; foreign trade is quite limited. Now there is some kind of push for more foreign trade. Europe realizes its trade is overly concentrated within itself, impeding technological progress and economic expansion. So there is a desire to open up. Isolation is not to its advantage. Unemployment in Europe may be improved, but not by much.

Some factors deserve to be mentioned here. First, it will not be easy to bring down the high interest rates in the United States. If the Soviet Union and the United States reach some kind of a compromise regarding the arms race around 1987, the United States, out of selfinterest, may lower the interest rates marginally. Otherwise, the rates will probably stay high. High interest rates inevitably cause a flood of Western European and Japanese capital to flow into the United States. Equally inevitably, this capital outflow leads to economic frictions between the United States and Western Europe and Japan. Also inevitable is the high exchange rate of the U.S. dollar. The discount rate in the United States is usually 7 percent, compared to 4 to 5 percent in Japan, and 5 percent in West Germany. The differences are significant. Western Europe has asked the United States to bring down its interest rates slightly. But the United States, in need of capital, does not want the interest rates to come down.

The question now is how much room Reagan has to maneuver on the budgetary front following the adoption of his military buildup plan. If he has a good deal of leeway, it is possible to lower the interest rate not just by 1 percent, but perhaps by 2, 5 or 6 percent. But I think that will be very

difficult. Research on SDI, a mammoth program, has just begun, having barely been put together as a piece of systems engineering. In no way can it be stopped in the next 2 years. If a halt is necessary for political reasons in 1987, it will be at most a postponement in production; research and testing absolutely must go on. There will only be limited cuts in U.S. military spending and it is possible for interest rates to inch down just a little, but a significant decline is out of the question. As a result, the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar will not drop. Japanese and Australian experts think the U.S. dollar is currently overvalued and will be just right if it depreciates by 20 to 25 percent. The United States, however, is reluctant to make such a move at present. In any case the experts believe that it will be disastrous for the dollar to decline by 25 percent within a year, a dangerous development for the entire Western economy. This is because Western Europe has a vast amount of U.S. dollars on hand and is very concerned about the movements of that currency. A slow fall is fine, but a precipitate tumble will be extremely unfavorable to them. The exchange rate of the dollar and interest rates will not fluctuate sharply in the next 5 years, rising or falling 15 to 20 percent at most.

Meanwhile, both the United States and Western Europe are retooling themselves, transforming their production equipment and constantly modernizing their technology. The United States has been doing so for some time, West Germany a little earlier, while France is a newcomer. All this may gradually have an effect after 3 years. It may support the U.S. economy and prevent it from declining significantly. Modernization of old industries also helps the economy.

The cyclical factor in the U.S. economy will remain. Based on the economic cycle, it was thought that the economy would bounce back in 1983 and 1984 after the 3-year recession from 1980 to 1982. Everybody thought that if the past was a clue to the future, when a recession lasts 36 months, then the recovery will go on for 36 to 39 months. The economy did rebound, but the laws of economics are no guide here; instead of running for 39 months, the recovery began to slow down after 24 months. A slowdown, of course, does not mean a recession. It is just that the cyclical factor is at work again. Most projections now call for a 36-month decline followed by a 24-month recovery, which means that there should be no problem this year. Many economists expect a downturn after the second quarter of 1986 and before the third quarter of 1987 when the cyclical factor will be at work.

The structural factor has to do with changes in the employment structure in industry. This factor has little effect. The impact of investments will not be felt until after 3 to 5 years. It will be toward the last couple of years of this period that investments will begin to have a little effect.

Of the three kinds of factors today, the cyclical factor has only limited impact, while the structural factor seems ineffective. Europe will be doing quite well if it can maintain a growth rate of 2.5 percent. This is because Europe has serious labor troubles and is plagued with problems. Japan essentially should be able to keep its economy going. Its biggest problem now is the U.S. demand that it stimulates domestic demand and increase military spending. Japan, however, feels that abandoning the export orientation of its

economy would pose horrendous difficulties in terms of overhauling the entire economy. It cannot make up its mind. Still the Japanese economy will remain predominantly export-oriented. The way things stand, it should be able to continue to grow at 4 percent, despite rising protectionism.

A few other factors are also quite important. First, the labor movement in the United States has been weakened considerably. Union members made up 18 percent of all workers in the country in late 1984, down from 23 percent in 1981. Second, the employment structure has changed markedly: The number of manual and technical workers has dropped sharply, while that of white-collar workers has increased significantly, affecting the nature of the labor movement. Third, acute conflicts between labor and management have given way to a measure of mutual compromise. Because of these factors, the Western economy nowadays is less vulnerable, less susceptible to attack. We must wait and see whether this is temporary or permanent.

To sum up, the economic situation in the next 5 years will be neither good nor bad. Things will not be excellent, nor will they be disastrous. Even if protectionism runs rampant, it will not have a major impact because many new avenues have been opened up. To chalk up a high growth rate, the Soviet Union may go in for extensive development and marshal tremendous manpower and financial resources to build many new plants. It is possible that the Soviet economy may grow somewhat during the next 5 years, particularly to meet military needs stimulated by SDI. It must expand the military; it has no other choice. There are two possible developments in the Japanese economy in the coming 5 years. It may expand domestic demand and beef up its military. Alternatively it may use China and Southeast Asia to replace its markets and redirect some of its capital from the United States. Needless to say, it is not going to give up its markets in the United States or Europe.

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## CHEN ZHONGJING DISCUSSES STRATEGIC FOREIGN POLICY

Beijing XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXI [CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] in Chinese No 1, 20 Jan 87 pp 5-7

[Article by Chen Zhongjing [7115 1813 4842]: "The Strategic Basis of China's Foreign Policy"]

[Text] I am writing a small book titled "International Strategic Issues." This is its first section, "Foreword," which I am releasing for early publication at the editor's invitation. It will be followed in order by "Contemporary International Strategic Situation," "International Strategic Thought," and certain international strategic issues. -- The author

Comrade Hu Yaobang said in his political report to the 12th National CPC Congress in September 1982, "China's foreign policy is based on the scientific theories of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and proceeds from the basic interests of the people of China and the world. It has a long-term comprehensive strategic basis. It will never accommodate itself to a particular expediency and is beyond anybody's instigation or provocation."

What exactly constitutes the long-term comprehensive strategic basis of China's foreign policy? How does it relate to scientific theories and the basic interests of the people of China and the world? This is a major issue worthy of our serious understanding. I am not qualified to shed light on it. As an elderly student, however, I do want to study it in depth extensively. This little book is merely a research report containing an individual's opinions.

The term "zhanlue" was translated from the English word "strategy" and the German word "strategie" by the Japanese. Its etymological root is the Latin word "strategos." Originally a military expression, it was used by the emperors and generals of the Eastern Roman Empire over 1,000 years ago. As the characters suggest, "strategy" refers to the general plan or guiding principles in a war or in fighting. In several of his military treatises written in 1936 and 1938, Comrade Mao Zedong offered a brilliant and elaborate elucidation of strategic issues. Although his emphasis then was on the strategic issues of China's internal revolutionary war and national war, the theoretical and practical implications of his writings go far beyond the military terrain. This was true then and has been true ever since. Today we

often use the word "strategy" more generally and more broadly to mean more profound things, that is, we use it in a political sense. War is the continuation of politics by special means. It is politics with bloodshed. Through the ages, every war had its political side and its underlying political purpose. As a substructure, economics is what will ultimately decide everything. Yet politics is the epitome of economics. Consequently the political implications of strategy are more inclusive, often embracing military strategy and economic strategy. Chinese and foreign strategists and experts on strategy have been using the term "grand strategy" and others like "overall strategy," "total strategy," and "national strategy" as distinct from the purely military strategy for a long time. There is nothing wrong with that. But in our language, strategy implies political strategy. Discussing a certain issue with a foreign friend in November 1982, Comrade Deng Xiaoping said, "Only by considering the matter from the international strategic perspective, that is, political perspective, will we be able to handle it properly." That is the idea. Also illustrating this point is what Comrade Mao Zedong said in his book, "On Protracted War," "If I can build up a Pacific anti-Japanese front diplomatically and turn China, the people's movement in Japan, the Soviet Union, and possibly other nations each into a strategic unit, spreading a dragnet from which fascist monkeys cannot escape, then that will be the end of the enemy." When the terms "international strategic issues" and "strategy" are used in this research report, it is their political aspects and broader implications which are being stressed.

Every "strategy" touches upon the "whole situation" for a "fairly long period of time." The whole may be a nation or a certain region in the world (say, the Middle East or the Asian Pacific rim). An even larger "whole" is the entire world (even including space). A so-called strategy or strategic issue involves studying, mastering, and applying the laws that cover the "whole for a long period of time" in the real-world struggle (or work) and in practical relations. The laws may be in such fields as politics, military, economics, and ideology, among others. The meaning of international strategy can be deduced by analogy. Strategy (strategic principle) is at a higher level than specific policies. Policies have their "long-term comprehensive strategic basis." Let's set aside for the time being objective things and objective laws. As for the oft-mentioned "grand policy," it actually means strategy, strategic thinking, strategic principle, or "strategic policy-making."

The whole consists of all its parts. (It may be said that a fairly large whole comprises a number of smaller "wholes.") If there are no parts, there will be no such thing as the whole. But the parts must be subordinate to and obey the whole. When we carefully analyze, tackle, and handle a part at a particular point in time (which may become a strategic unit under certain circumstances), we must take pains to consider the relations of this part to the whole and its function. Does it serve any function? Is it a major function? How long? What about the timing? Is it a positive or negative function? In addition, we must be adept at bringing together a multitude of parts and applying them to the whole. At the same time, we must start out with a long-term strategic overall plan with which to evaluate, analyze, consider, and handle each part, especially the more important parts. If a comprehensive planner fails to reconcile the whole with the parts, the long-term with the short-term, he will in effect be overlooking the long-term and the strategic whole. A person does

not deserve to be called a resolute visionary politician or a gifted and bold strategist if he is preoccupied with immediate partial interests, accommodates the interests of an individual or a group, miscalculates or mishandles a certain part (particularly an important part), and is otherwise shortsighted, considers a matter in isolation, and fails to look ahead or see the whole picture. At most he is a mere routinist, a tactician, a very indifferent strategist. Even the person in charge of a part should strive to emulate the achievements of a strategist. On the one hand, he must be an expert in some field. On the other hand, he must develop an overall perspective. Comrade Mao Zedong compared strategy and international strategic issues to world chess in the section "encirclement and counter-encirclement" in his book "On Protracted War." A game of chess too has its parts and whole, its tactics and strategy. A mediocre chess player lacks a strategic overall perspective, has no well-defined strategic goals, and often makes one move at a time. He considers only the short-term and may succumb to enemy instigation or temptation, "taking the plunge as soon as provoked." In the end, this kind of player will find himself trapped in a passive position, despite the hard tactical work he has done. Whatever moves he makes will be idle, irrelevant, or futile. Once a strategic error is committed, once a "fatal" move affecting the whole game is made, one finds oneself in the situation suggested by this Chinese saying: "one careless move, and the game is lost." A clever chess player, on the other hand, has a clear strategic vision and the courage, resourcefulness, and decisiveness to plan comprehensively, taking everything into consideration. Every single move follows his strategic goals closely, which puts him in a better position to seize the initiative throughout the game. Let's illustrate this with a random example. Several years ago, LA REPUBLICA, the Italian newspaper, carried an interview with (Jin Ni A Nie Li), chairman of the Fiat Company of Italy, who was then visiting New York. He was asked about his opinions and those of the U.S. political and financial circles on the setbacks in the relations between the Italian Communist Party and Moscow. At the end of the interview, the chairman said, "In short, a new chessman has been put on the board. Naturally everybody is forced to reconsider the moves he is going to make in the game." Meaningful words.

"It has a long-term, comprehensive strategic basis." How long is "long-term" in this sentence? Reflecting on the past in light of the present, I think it should be 2 to 3 years, or 3 to 5 years at least, and dozens, or even 100, years at most. In certain areas, such as ideology and world religion, long-term may mean centuries or even a millennium. Certainly there are cases where taking an overly long-term view would remove an issue from real-life struggle (work) and practical relations and bring it closer to and even entirely within the field of theorizing rather than "strategy." Also, where "strategic basis," strategic issues, and international strategic issues are concerned, long-term involves "strategic periods" and "strategic changes." A strategic period often contains the seeds of a strategic change or strategic adjustment or supplementation in the coming strategic periods. Strategic thinking too must develop as objective realities develop constantly.

As I see it, learning and studying international strategic issues should not be the concern of experts alone. In a socialist country which firmly implements an independent foreign policy and insists on opening to the outside world, in particular, international strategic issues should be the business of



every citizen, at least everybody involved in foreign affairs, however "slightly." Whether we are at home or abroad, all of us, including students studying abroad or people from all professions or trades who make short trips overseas or take part in receptions, must not bury ourselves in our specialty or confine our attention to routines. Instead, we must equip ourselves with some "political" thought and a strategic overall perspective. That way, whether our aim is to understand a foreign nation, publicize the motherland, or promote friendship, we can operate from a strategically advantageous position in dealing with foreigners on all occasions. We will think at a higher level, our vision will be broader, our work style more expansive, and ourselves more interesting. And we will work better.

12581

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MEANING OF 'DEVELOPING MARXISM' DISCUSSED

Shanghai SHEHUI KEXUE SOCIAL SCIENCES in Chinese No 11, 15 Nov 86 pp 2-4

[Article by Su Dongbin [5685 2639 2430], Heilongjiang Institute of Social Sciences: "Relearning the Meaning of 'Marxist Developments'"; first paragraph is source-supplied introduction]

[Excerpt] The author spoke at the National Marxist-Leninist and Mao Zedong Ideology Symposium in September of this year. His speech kindled heated debates among the participants at the symposium. In compliance with the policy of letting a hundred schools of thought contend, this journal is publishing parts of that speech.

I. Comments On The 5 Different Meanings Of The Expression "Marxist Developments"

Today in academic circles there are five situations where the word "development" is used in association with the Marxist doctrine:

A. It means the carrying forward of mankind's advanced ideas. All ideas have a sense of legacy; they are based on, and are developed from, the thinkings of the predecessors. This is even more true for the more advanced ideas. In discussing the three sources of Marxism, Lenin wrote, "Marxism is the consummate result of mankind's 19th century creations; it is the indisputable heir to the German philosophy, British political economics, and French socialism. (Footnote 1) ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 2, p 441-442)

B. It means to extend or to condense specific Marxist viewpoints: for example, Marx predicted that all society's means of production would one day belong to society. Today, some Marxist theorist believe that under socialism, a large part of society's means of production is under public ownership. The latter idea is founded on the former, and is in line with the former idea. Therefore, this kind of "development" is in fact a kind of "supplement."

C. It is the belief and practice of the system of Marxist theories. People often say "we are Marxists," or "this is Marxism as practiced in China," or "this is Chinese style Marxism," and so on. This kind of "development" is in fact a kind of "preservation."

However, the popular implications of "development" in academic circles today are not the above implications, instead, they are the following kinds:

D. Using a Marxist stance, viewpoint, and methodology to create new ideas in a realm untouched by the founders. For example, the idea that "one nation, two systems" is workable under socialism: this is a new "creation."

E. Using a Marxist stance, viewpoint, and methodology to reach a different, or even an opposite, conclusion to an existing issue. For example, Marx and Engels asserted categorically that socialism would destroy the commodity economy, but the CPC Central Committee, in its decision to restructure the economic system, has determined that socialism is a "planned commodity economy": this in fact is a kind of "revision," and is of course an "innovation."

Therefore, we must not generalize the expression "Marxist developments." The first three implications basically are upholding Marxism, the latter two in fact are new creations, or more precisely, new ideas under the guidance of Marxism, but not new creations of Marxism per se.

## II. Five Defects Generated By The Usage Of The Term "Development" In The Latter Meanings

### A. Losing the Preciseness of Marxism

A doctrine should have specific and definite substance. If we view all related ideas of the later generations as part of the predecessor's idea, then it will be difficult to define the substance of the predecessor's doctrine. For example, Mao Zedong repeatedly expressed that he had accomplished two major tasks in his lifetime, one of them was initiating the "cultural revolution." The theoretical support behind that movement was "The Theory On The Continuation Of The Revolution Under The Proletariat Dictatorship." At one time, this was deemed "the third milestone in the history of the development of Marxism." But experience proved that this viewpoint was indeed wrong. It was not a Marxist development, in fact, it violated the basic principles of Marxism completely, and it even violated much of Mao's own earlier scientific judgements. But, the reason we dare to make such a comment today is not just because time has given us the proof (the 10 years of "cultural revolution" brought nothing but disaster for China and the world), or because the people have become more knowledgeable (by rethinking the Marxist theories), but it is because of the turns of events and changes in objective conditions (Mao's demise, and the fall of the gang of four). If the suggestion, or the practice, of all new ideas are considered "developments" in Marxism, then what is considered a development today may not be considered a "development" tomorrow, and it is impossible to define the specific substance of Marxism.

### B. Damaging the Sense of Completeness of Marxism

A doctrine must have its systematic theory and proposition, and therefore, it must be a complete system, and has a unique structure. The originator of an

idea may further develop or modify his earlier or later ideas, but nobody else has the right to further develop those specific ideas. Lenin clearly pointed out in his article "Karl Marx" that "Marxism is the system of Marx's viewpoint and doctrine." (Footnote 2) ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 2, p 580) Marxism was created by Marx and Engels; it has its fixed theoretical viewpoint and unique approach to ideas, and it has its inherent nascent, developmental, and final stages. When the two originators died, the creation of Marxism was complete. If we integrate all ideas consistent with the basic Marxist viewpoint with practices in China, and attribute them all to Marxism, then the ideas of yesterday's Mao Zedong and Stalin, today's and tomorrow's Chinese and world leaders should also be considered developments of Marxism, then even after many generations, will Marxism per se even be complete?

### C. Distorting the Original Meaning of Marxism

A development must more or less be consistent with the original work. To call an opposite idea a "development" of the original idea would be unfair to the originator of that idea. As mentioned earlier, Marx and Engels asserted that commodity productions would not exist under socialism, and no matter how hard their followers might try, they would not come to the opposite conclusion. Today, if we interpret the proposition that socialism is a planned commodity economy as consistent with the meaning of Marxism, then we are distorting Marx and Engel's original meaning.

### D. Diminishing the Value of New Ideas

The emergence of a new idea not only has great theoretical significance, but it can also lead to great practical movements. If we incorporate all brilliant ideas into the predecessor's system of thinkings, then no new idea will ever have the honor of being unique; this diminishes the worth of the later thinkers.

Brilliant new ideas explore new territories, or they rectify and criticize old conclusions. Actually, the originators of Marxism never tried to conceal their flaws or mistakes. As early as in 1872, they declared that "The Communist Manifesto" was "not thorough" and was "behind the times" in certain places. In 1884, Engels criticized his earlier work "A Critique of Political Economics", and seriously pointed out that "I clearly know that it is obsolete; not only are there many flaws, but there are many mistakes. I am afraid that it will do more harm than good because of the misunderstandings it may cause. (Footnote 3) ("The Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 36, p 172) By the 1890's, in reevaluating the 1848 revolution in Europe, Engels frankly admitted that history had proven that he was wrong: "our viewpoint at that time was but an illusion. (Footnote 4) ("The Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 22, p 595) These mistakes happen because "we can only learn under the conditions of our own times, and the standard of those conditions determines the level of our knowledge." (Footnote 5) ("The Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 3, p 562)

Obviously all doctrines and all ideas are the products of history. In his "Anti-Duebring," Engels pointed out that "the theoretical thinking of every era, and thus the theoretical thinking of our era, is the product of history. In different eras ideas take on different forms, and thus they have different substance." This says Marxism is also a historical science; it is a school of thought on the history of the development of the ideas of mankind. Marx once emphasized that "each historical era has its own set of laws. As life progresses, it develops from one phase into another, and comes under the domination of a different set of laws. (Footnote 6) ("The Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 23, p 23) Therefore, since there are "different forms," "different substance," and "new sets of laws," we should explain them with "different" or "other" ideas.

For example, although the general policy of "one nation, two systems" may be consistent with Marxist stance and methodology, this viewpoint is not inherent in Marxism; in facts it is contrary to Marxism, because according to Marx, even in the first phase of communism there can only be one nation and one system. We should just admit that it is a new idea. This kind of acknowledgement will neither damage Marxism, nor will it overly flatter today's revolutionaries: just as in natural science we are not obligated to call the inventor of television an important development of the discovery of electricity.

#### E. Causing Theoretical Confusions

The most serious defect lies in the tendency to make erroneous theories appear brilliant. Everybody can claim that his idea is a further development of Marxism. It makes no difference whether one understands Marxist viewpoints correctly, or if one truly believes in the Marxist doctrine, or whether one is from China or abroad, or whether one is from a socialist country or a nonsocialist country, and whether it is today, tomorrow, or the day after. I believe that there are many socialist theories and practices in the world, but there is only one form of Marxism. We must reject the concept of those western scholars who talk about "Marx' Marxism," or "Mao Zedong's Marxism," or "Boerbute's Marxism." Eventhough an idea may belong in a greater system of ideas, as long as it is a new idea, it should be given unique recognition.

12968/9738

CSO: 4005/389

NEWLY ENACTED BANKRUPTCY LAW INTERPRETED

Beijing ZHONGGUO FAZHI BAO in Chinese 5 Dec 86 pp 1, 4

[By staff reporter: "The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law Also an 'Encouragement Law'; a Leading Cadre of the Legislative Work Committee of the NPC Standing Committee Replies to Reporter's Questions on the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Draft)"]

[Text] Following adoption of the "Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the PRC (Draft)" [EBL] by the 18th Session of the 6th NPC Standing Committee, this reporter approached a leading cadre of the Legislative Work Committee of the NPC Standing Committee to ask questions relating to this law and was granted an interview.

Question: Why was the EBL enacted?

Answer: The purpose of enacting the EBL was to adapt to the needs of the developing socialist planned commodity economy and of the reform of our economic system. China's socialist enterprises under the system of public ownership play a leading role in our socialist modernizations. There are, however, some enterprises under the system of public ownership which have been badly managed, have been incurring losses over a long period of time, and which, therefore, rely on financial subsidies from the state. They are "eating from the big pot" of the state and are a heavy burden for the state, a condition which is detrimental to socialist economic development. Enacting the EBL and instituting a bankruptcy system among enterprises under the system of public ownership is an important measure to solve the problem of these enterprises "eating from the big pot" of the state. More importantly, a bankruptcy system can also effectively stimulate our enterprises to actually apply their powers of self-determination in their business administration, implement the factory director (manager) responsibility system and other types of economic responsibility systems, strengthen the democratic management in enterprises, and to inject new vitality into the enterprises. In this sense, the bankruptcy law is also an "encouragement law."

Question: In what way is bankruptcy delimited in the EBL?

Answer: Article 3 of the EBL prescribes: "An enterprise that has incurred heavy losses and is unable to pay its debts on time, shall be declared bankrupt, according to the provisions of this law." To properly delimit bankruptcy in the EBL, the laws of many other countries have been consulted, while due consideration was also given to conditions presently prevailing in China.

At present, self-determination is not yet implemented in all of China's enterprises under the system of public ownership, and the price structure has not yet been properly regulated. There are, therefore, complex reasons for losses being incurred by enterprises. Precisely by taking these actual conditions into consideration, Article 3 of the EBL, while formulating the above-mentioned delimitation, added two provisions for cases in which bankruptcy should not be declared and one provision for cases when bankruptcy procedures should be suspended. Enterprises whose creditors have applied for bankruptcy may still gain a reprieve from being declared bankrupt, even if their conditions conform to the above-mentioned conditions, if there is a chance for their recovery, namely:

First, public utility enterprises and enterprises of vital importance for the national economy and for the livelihood of the people must not be declared bankrupt if relevant departments of the government will provide financial aid or adopt other measures to help these enterprises pay their debts.

Second, an enterprise must also not be declared bankrupt if it can raise guarantees to have its debts paid off within 6 months of the creditors' bankruptcy application.

Furthermore, if the superior authority in charge applies for reorganization and a settlement is also reached between the enterprise and the entire body of creditors, the bankruptcy procedure shall be suspended, to give the enterprise an opportunity to reorganize.

It is clear from the above-stated provisions that the bankruptcy system enacted by China aims, first of all, at reorganization, rescue, and reducing the numbers of bankruptcies. There is no intention to let things drift along endlessly; only when debts really cannot be paid back on time, will a declaration of bankruptcy be allowed. It follows, therefore, that in view of the above provisions, possibly only very few enterprises will be declared bankrupt and that also only very few staff and workers will actually be affected by bankruptcies. However, since there does exist the threat of bankruptcy, this will encourage enterprises on the verge of bankruptcy to make every effort to improve their business management, raise economic results, and strive to transform a deficit into a profit situation. This is also a basic objective in enacting the EBL.

Question: What are the provisions of the EBL on the reorganization of enterprises for which bankruptcy has been applied?

Answer: Apart from Article 3, which contains provisions on reorganization, the EBL has a special chapter on reorganization, which mainly prescribes:

1. The prerequisite for the reorganization of an enterprise for which bankruptcy has been applied are: 1) an application must be filed by the supervisory government department of the enterprise; 2) a settlement must have been agreed upon between the enterprise and its creditors.

2. The reorganization of an enterprise for which bankruptcy has been applied is a responsibility of the superior government department of the enterprise. The organization to be set up for the reorganization and the specific plan of reorganization are all to be decided upon by the superior government department. To strengthen supervision of the reorganization by staff and workers, to strengthen the staff and workers' sense of being masters, and to strengthen the democratic management of the enterprise, the EBL furthermore provides: "The reorganization plan of the enterprise must be discussed by the staff and workers' assembly of the enterprise. The conditions of the enterprise reorganization must be reported to the staff and workers' assembly, and their opinions must be solicited."

3. Midway discontinuation of reorganization: If an enterprise for which bankruptcy had been applied does not fulfill during its reorganization the settlement that had been agreed upon, or if its financial condition continues to deteriorate, or if acts occur that seriously harm the interests of the creditors, the people's court can decide to discontinue the reorganization midway.

4. Conclusion of reorganization: If the reorganization has enabled the enterprise to pay its debts according to the terms of the settlement, the people's court may discontinue bankruptcy procedures. If the time set for the reorganization has expired and the enterprise is unable to pay its debts according to the terms of the settlement, the people's court may declare the enterprise bankrupt.

Question: What are the provisions of the EBL regarding public assistance for staff and workers in the aftermath of an enterprise bankruptcy?

Answer: Public assistance measures for staff and workers of a bankrupt enterprise directly affects the personal interests of the masses of staff and workers, a problem that must be appropriately resolved, and one in which one must not adopt an attitude of evading responsibility for the fate of the staff and workers. This is determined by the essential character of the socialist system, as it is also a special feature of China's bankruptcy law.

Article 4 of the EBL prescribes: "The state will make appropriate arrangements in a variety of ways for staff and workers of bankrupt enterprises to be reemployed elsewhere and will also ensure their basic livelihood needs for the time until their reemployment, details to be separately determined by the State Council." This article provides, first, for the reemployment of staff and workers of bankrupt enterprises, namely, that appropriate arrangements for their reassignment will have to be made by the relevant government departments. Second, the law provides that the basic



livelihood needs of staff and workers during the time until their reemployment must be guaranteed. Of course, even greater care must be given to old staff and workers or those injured on duty. As to the specific measures for actual execution of the above-stated provisions, the State Council will have to issue separate regulations. Thus, the State Council, based on these provisions of the law, will gradually enact relevant specific regulations and will furthermore gradually perfect them in the course of actual practice.

Question: What are the provisions of the EBL regarding the legal responsibility of the legal representative of a bankrupt enterprise and of the leading cadres in its superior government department?

Answer: Article 42 of the EBL provides for legal responsibility of the legal representative of a bankrupt enterprise and of the leading cadres of its superior government department.

Currently, there are many reasons for China's enterprises under the system of public ownership to incur losses, and these are rather complex. They cannot all be blamed on the enterprise and its legal representative. Even if serious losses are due to poor business management, leading to the insolvency of the enterprise, they are not necessarily all cases for which the legal representative of the enterprise bears main responsibility. In some it is the responsibility of the superior government department, and it will then be necessary to investigate closely the responsibility of the cadre in charge in the superior organ. On conditions of this nature, the EBL has the following provisions in its Article 42:

If an enterprise is declared bankrupt, the supervisory departments and the auditing departments of the government shall investigate and establish the responsibility for the bankruptcy of the enterprise. They shall thoroughly analyze the specific conditions and closely investigate and establish culpability of whoever is responsible.

If the legal representative is found to bear primary responsibility for the bankruptcy of his enterprise an administrative sanction shall be imposed on him.

If the superior government department is found to bear primary responsibility for the bankruptcy of the enterprise, an administrative sanction shall be imposed on the leading cadre in the said superior department.

If the bankruptcy of the enterprise, resulting in serious property losses for the state, is due to dereliction of duties by the legal representative of the enterprise or the leading cadre of the superior government department, criminal responsibility shall be established according to Article 187 of the Penal Code.

The leading cadre of the Legislative Work Committee, furthermore, said that instituting the bankruptcy system in China's enterprises under the system of public ownership is a new reform measure, which is still not yet well understood by many people. It is therefore very necessary to intensify propaganda on behalf of the EBL, bringing understanding of the main content of

the law to enterprises and the masses of their staff and workers, and having them properly understand its functions and positive significance. He proposed that all relevant departments should carry out effective propaganda work in a variety of ways and by different means.

9808

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CASES OF FALSE ACCUSATIONS ON RISE

Beijing ZHONGGUO FAZHI BAO in Chinese 11 Dec 86 p 1

[By reporter Gao Erting [7550 1422 0080]: "Infringements on the Democratic Rights and Human Rights of Citizens Not To Be Tolerated; Procuratorial Organs Throughout the Country Are Actively Investigating and Prosecuting Cases of False Accusations and Frameups"]

[Excerpts] Starting out from the principle of protecting the democratic rights and human rights of citizens, all procuratorial organs throughout the country wield the weapon of law in their fight against the crimes of false accusations and frameups.

In the course of investigating and prosecuting cases of false accusations and frameups, the procuratorial organs at all levels stress the investigation of these crimes when directed against persons carrying out reforms. Because he had one of his personal demands ignored, Cheng Yadong [4453 0068 2639], a driver at the No 3 Plant of the Hefei Steelworks, fabricated certain facts and wrote more than 40 letters to the safety department of the factory, falsely accusing the director of the No 3 Plant, Comrade Zhang Chu [1728 0443], who is a keen reformer and who had been awarded the honorable title of "nationwide outstanding young factory director," accusing him of having serious problems, economically, politically and in his workstyle. The Hefei procuratorate very quickly established the true facts and arrested Cheng Yadong according to law.

Procuratorial organs all over the country, under the personal leadership of their chief procurators, will take energetic action in all large and important cases in which circumstances and consequences are of a serious nature, which have an extremely harmful impact, and of which the effect is highly disruptive and obstructive. In an integration of higher and lower authority, each level urging on the next level, cases will be investigated and dealt with most exhaustively. For instance, the case of false accusation and frameup involving Hong Dengke [3163 4098 4430], chief of the Beizhan police substation of the Fuzhou Municipal Police Bureau in Jiangxi Province, had broad ramifications and was well shielded, and, therefore, made detection very difficult. The chief procurator of Jiangxi Province, Wang Shuheng [3769 2885 5899] personally took charge, promptly consulted the provincial party committee and the Fuzhou municipal party committee and gained their support.

Working in a coordinated manner with the departments in charge, the case was brought to a successful conclusion according to law.

From January to September of this year, the entire procuratorial system throughout the country took on and investigated 258 cases of false accusations and frameups.

9808

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CAUSES OF CRIME UNDER SOCIALIST SYSTEM EXPLORED

Shanghai MINZU YU FAZHI [DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL SYSTEM] in Chinese No 11, 12 Nov 86 pp 12-13

[Article by Hung Peilin [3163 3099 7207], vice chairman of the standing committee of the Jiangsu Provincial People's Congress under the "Democracy and Legal System Forum" rubric: "Discussions on the Root-Causes of Crime in a Socialist Country"]

[Excerpts] Many experts seem to agree on what the source of crime is--crime is a product of class distinctions in society; it is a unique phenomenon in a society where there are class antagonisms, and crime can be eliminated only if class distinctions are eliminated.

Then in our socialist society, what causes crime?

Of course, class is the main and essential root of all crime. In China, because of domestic factors and foreign influences, class struggle of a limited scope will always exist. The counterrevolutionaries, the spies, and the agents who are hostile to socialism, and who intend to destroy socialism, obviously constitute a confrontation. Some criminal offenses which severely damage the socialist order, including the serious economic crimes, are directly antisocialist, and are also reflections of class struggles, but they constitute only a small portion of all crimes. To try to trace most other common criminal offenses to class sources is unrealistic, and does not solve practical problems. China has banished the exploiting class and the exploitative system, and class antagonism no longer exists, yet there are crimes; in fact, there has been significant increases in serious crimes. Prior to the initiation of the movement to crack down on serious crimes in the latter part of 1983, the serious crime rate had increased significantly over a period of 3 years. This situation reminds us that under socialism, it is necessary to study class as a source of crime, but in addition, it is important to study the social sources of crime, that is, sources not related to class.

Marx and Engels pointed out that "crime is the most obvious and most extreme demonstration of the contempt for social order." This statement is valid in

all societies, with or without class antagonism. It shows that crime has a social nature as well as a class nature. Therefore, not all crimes are of a class nature, nor are they unique in a society with class antagonisms. This is because not all social conflicts are class conflicts. Lenin said, "In a socialist system there is no antagonism, but there will always be conflicts." In the present phase in China, "class struggle of a limited scope will always exist." That is to say, of all social conflicts, only some are of a class struggle nature; many social conflicts which involve politics, cultural ideology, and lifestyle, are no longer of a class struggle nature, that is to say, they no longer represent the conflict of basic interests between different classes, and can no longer be considered class struggles. This type of conflict among the people which do not have a class struggle nature is largely in the form of conflicts in national interests, collective interests, and personal interests; these may be partial or total interest, short-term or long-term interests. They may also be in the form of conflicts between the bureaucratic style of the government workers and the people, or conflicts among people who share a common interest but who seek different specific benefits. In addition, there can be conflicts between the corruption of the old society and the moral standards of socialism, or conflicts between the progressive and the backward. If these conflicts are not handled properly and promptly, they will intensify, and even lead to crimes.

In China today, most criminal offenders, including murderers, arsonists, robbers, rapists, hoodlums, and criminals who disrupt the socialist economic order, are not penalized as counterrevolutionaries under our legal system. The main reason is that most of these criminals do not intend to overturn the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist system; their crimes cannot be categorized class struggles, and therefore do not have class attributes. Only those serious crimes which are aimed at overthrowing the regime of the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist system have class attributes and can be categorized as class struggles.

Comrade Peng Zhen [1756 3791] pointed out that "there is a new phenomenon today, and that is, the disruptive elements in society today are from a very different family background and class status than their past counterparts: in the past, they came from the exploiting class and the dregs of the old society, but today they come from among the ordinary people, most are youths and young adults, young workers and students; they are from among the basic masses (workers, farmers, intellectuals, and cadres) who grew up in the new society." This clearly points out that under our new historical conditions, the make-up of the criminal elements has basically changed. This is a major premise which must be clarified when we explore the causes of crime in a socialist society.

Many facts have shown that there are two aspects to the main causes of crime: the conflicts in society, and the conflicts between individuals.

Social conflict is the result of differences in the people's material and spiritual lives. For example, there are conflicts between what people want

and what in reality they can get in matters concerning jobs, schools, and daily economic and spiritual necessities, and when these conflicts clash with personal interests, they can build up and eventually lead to crime.

China is in the midst of restructuring her urban and rural economic systems. It is inevitable that there will be new conflicts as a result of changes: for example, there are changes in the personnel system, and there are readjustments in the price system and the wage system, and all changes will necessarily affect the interests of some individuals and small cliques. In addition, some local areas which are trying to develop production will encounter more conflicts involving investments in new factories, or the marketing of commodities in great demand, as well as conflicts in raw material supplies versus production needs. If these conflicts are not properly resolved, they can intensify and lead to crime.

The relationship between social conflicts and crimes are also found in other areas like production organization, economic management, arts and entertainment, and other activities where laws and regulations are imperfect and flawed, and the resulting loopholes give the criminal elements the opportunity to commit crime.

Under socialism where the private ownership of factors of production has basically been eliminated, conflicts between individuals are mainly the result of disputes over the ownership of material goods such as housing and properties. In production and business, conflicts arise because of disputes over land, water, forests and hills, and water rights. These conflicts when intensified can also lead to crime.

Conflicts between individuals also appear in personal relationships over love, marriage, or between husband and wife, between parents and children, or among siblings. Within these relationships conflicts may arise over specific interests, including material and spiritual interests, such as inheritance, support or alimony, favoritism, partiality, and lack of trust. When these conflicts intensify they sometimes lead to crime. According to statistics, 80 percent of the major murder and assault cases in 1985 involved marriages, love, family disputes, money, debts, and neighborhood quarrels.

Personal conflicts occur in everyday contacts triggered by jealousy, pomposity, pride, impulse, or even recreation. When these conflicts build up, they can lead to crime.

Our society is full of conflicts; life is full of conflicts, but not all conflicts lead to clashes, or necessarily lead to crimes. Most people do not commit crime; only a small number of people do. Every individual has certain material and cultural needs and desires, and people always have conflicts and differences in these areas. Why do some people commit crime while the majority of the people do not? This can be explained by the differences in their political quality: their moral standards, ideology and knowledge, conception of the legal system, culture and education. Most people consciously act within

social boundaries; only a small minority act beyond social order and break the law. Backward ideology, corrupt morality, lack of a concept of law and order, even a total disrespect for the law, or total ignorance of the law: these are the causes of crime.

In short, the counterrevolutionary elements and some criminal elements who seriously disrupt social order, including those who commit serious crimes and economic crimes, intend to destroy socialism, and those whose crimes have class attributes. But most criminal offenses and economic crimes are not aimed at destroying socialism, and do not have class attributes.

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SU SHAOZHI DISCUSSES POLITICAL STRUCTURAL REFORM

Beijing DUSHU [READING] in Chinese No 9, 10 Sep 86 pp 3-9

[Article by Su Shaozhi [5685 4801 2535], director of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: "My Humble Opinions on Reforming the Political System"]

[Text] Political reform and ideological renewal are what is urgently needed in the present stage of the economic reform.

We began the reform of the economic system after the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. The reform has been partial, local and purely economic. It is not systematic and comprehensive. And we have failed to combine economic reform with political, social, and cultural reforms. The new and the old economic systems are now in a balance, a stalemate. The methods we use to solve problems arising in the course of the reform are basically methods of the old system. The necessary preparations or guarantees for in-depth political and ideological reforms are lacking. The economic reform is becoming increasingly more than just "economic" reform. It is hampered by political, social, and psychological factors.

Modernization is not limited to the "four modernizations." The "four modernizations" are material aspects of modernization. Modernization should also include political, social, cultural, and ideological modernizations. Real modernization is the simultaneous modernization of the system and the people themselves. China needs modernization, and not just the "four modernizations."

A major obstacle to China's reform and modernization at present is the remaining influence of feudal despotism in the ideological and political field.

China has a 2,000-year history of feudal despotism. The country had long been the unified domain of a feudal despotic empire. Owing to the short duration of its control of the mainland and its peculiar nature, the Republic of China was unable to eliminate feudal despotism. In post-liberation China, a great deal of feudal despotism remained, and the task to eliminate the remaining influence of feudal despotism in the ideological and political field has not been accomplished.

Special privileges are the concentrated expression of feudal despotism in society today. The symptoms of special privileges in political and social life are known as "unhealthy tendencies." Bureaucratism, privileged businesses, nepotism, "special connections," and "petticoat influence" are all related to special privileges. The "unhealthy tendencies" are certainly not the result of reform and opening to the outside world, the latter of which may have contributed some external causes at most. In the ideological and cultural field, special privileges manifest themselves as cultural tyranny. "Putting a label on someone," "wielding a big stick," "giving somebody tight shoes to wear," "gossip- and rumormongering," "making things difficult," and "political interference in academic matters" are all related to special privileges.

Special privileges are created by feudal despotism. The emergence of special privileges reduces the ruling party's prestige, discredits Marxism, and dampens the masses' enthusiasm for development and reform.

The seriousness of feudal despotic influence shows the necessity to reappraise the present stage of social development in China.

Before social productive forces have reached a certain level, it is possible to start a socialist revolution and win victory, but it is impossible to build a completely socialist society. China's practice is convincing proof of this view. If the new democratic period had developed more fully, and if the transformation of the means of production had proceeded more steadily, things could be different today. The reform of the ownership system and the development of more economic sectors in the present stage shows that it is indeed necessary to make up what we failed to do in the past. China is now in the initial stage of socialism, or what is described by the Yugoslav theorist (Ge lie li qi ke fu) as the "early socialist" phase. Many socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, have reappraised the current stage of their social development. This is an objective and realistic stand. In methodology and practice, such a stand is of profound significance.

We should study and criticize the "peasant socialist" mentality. We should study the causes and objectives of past peasant revolutions in China and their impact on the present. We should also review and examine both the progressive and the backward and conservative aspects of the slogans, the calls and the programs of the new democratic period and the socialist period (including the "cultural revolution"). The past and the present are inseparable, and today is also linked to tomorrow. It is the responsibility of theoretical researchers to find these threads and links so that political reform can have clearly defined objectives.

The deformation of foreign things in China under the influence of feudal despotism is a question which merits in-depth study. For example, the principle of distribution according to work and the bonus system are good things aimed to arouse the producers' enthusiasm for work. But now there are abuses in bonus distribution. Bonus is in essence a part of surplus production. Only when more is produced, can there be more bonus distributions.

There should be no "abuses." The fact is, bonuses have become additional wages, a part of egalitarian distribution, and have lost the effect of stimulating the producers' enthusiasm. This is a form of deformation.

Also for example, the economic reform has introduced the principle of commodity production to break through the ossified system and overconcentration of power, which is also a good thing. However, under the influence of feudalistic factors, some cadres' children are going into business. They are no ordinary businessmen, but privileged ones. The danger is that they may become "capitalists among the influential." This is another kind of deformation.

Again for example, some of Mao Zedong's practices in the socialist period, particularly the theory of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the practices of the "cultural revolution," put forth in his later years, were also a kind of deformation, a deformation of Marxism and of the socialist image. This kind of deformation cannot be unrelated to feudal despotic ideas.

A major topic for political and cultural discussions today is to recognize the facts of deformation, identify them, and analyze their causes.

The Stalinist model and tradition is another major malady besides feudal despotism.

On dictatorship, Stalin simply stressed its repressive aspect, and ignored, even denied, its democratic aspect. He maintained that in a socialist society, with the success of socialist construction, class struggle will become increasingly acute. He placed himself on the peak of power, formed a personality cult, and abused his powers. He brutally interfered in the people's thinking and cultural life, and made himself the "top authority" and judge in history, linguistics, economics and what not. He pragmatically and subjectively distorted the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and ideology and turned the highly critical theories into rigid dogmas.... Factual and theoretical analyses have shown that some of Stalin's theories and practices were a twisted form of Marxism, a deformation influenced by the remaining czarist Russian despotic ideas. It had nothing in common with Marxism and the spirit of Lenin.

Stalin's theories and practices have a profound influence on us, from the 1930's to the present. In China's political reform, we must not only eliminate the pernicious influence of feudal despotism, but eradicate the influence of certain Stalinist theories and practices.

We should discuss the concept of "democratic centralism."

Marx never mentioned "democratic centralism." The concept was put forth by Lenin under the conditions of the Russian revolution. Later it was distorted, and the emphasis was placed only on centralization. "Democracy" under centralized guidance means that the people are not the masters, but the ruled.

We should emphasize the word "democratic," or translate the term as the "democratic system," to distinguish it from bureaucratic centralism, feudal centralism, capitalist centralism, and so forth. The centralism we are talking about must be built on the basis of democracy.

A question of understanding must be settled. Who is the main force in a socialist society, the people or the leadership? Not only some of the leaders as well as the masses do not have a definite answer to the question, but even we ourselves are not quite clear about it. The feudalistic social ideals of "sage kings and worthy ministers" and "upright officials" are often talked and thought about. Judging by their speeches, some elected people's representatives often think not first of their responsibilities to the people, but are grateful for the higher authorities' "trust" in them or the leadership's "concern" for them. Statements such as "listening attentively" to the masses' views, "promoting" cadres, people's representatives "studying" the government's work report, and so forth all demonstrate the same problem.

Democracy is our political ideal. It should be guaranteed by the political system and explained in political philosophy and political education. Only this will ensure that the people's interests are supreme.

Party leadership provides leadership for the correct line, principles, and policies. But it does not mean the party is monopolizing everything.

First, party and government must not be merged, and government power must not be turned into party power. For example, the meaning of the "system of factory directors assuming overall responsibility" is self-evident, and it is different in practice and as a concept from the "system of factory directors assuming responsibilities under the leadership of the party committees."

Second, relationship between the party and the law must be made clear. Which is more important, the party or the law? There can be only one supreme authority, and the party and the law cannot be put on a par. The constitution and the laws are enacted by the people's representatives, and the party is to serve the people. Therefore, it is only natural that the party must conduct its activities within the limits permitted by the constitution and the laws of the state, and that nobody is above the constitution and the laws. Thus, it goes without saying that the independence of the legislative and judicial organs should be among the objectives of the political reform.

Third, the relationship between the party and the mass organizations is not that between the "prime mover" and the "conveyor belts." The mass organizations can be "links" between the party and the masses, but "links" are not "conveyor belts" and not a part of the machine. The mass organizations can only be bridges between the party and the masses, or they will become components of the party organization. The mass organizations should represent the interests of the masses, and they have the right to independence. The relationship between the party and the mass organizations should be one of mutual cooperation, supervision, coordination, and promotion.

Life in a socialist society is not all of one color and unified. It is multifarious, rich and colorful. The social strata, groups and organizations in a socialist society are many and varied. We have seen not only the traditional differences between the working class and the peasantry, but other social strata, groups and organizations which have become increasingly distinct and active since the beginning of economic reform.

Economic interests are also many and varied in a socialist society. Owing to differences in skill, physical and family conditions, two persons doing the same kind of work will produce different results, and their actual incomes will also be different. This is true with individuals and even more so with classes, strata, interest groups, and social groups. We recognize that the common and long-range interests of all the people are the same. We also recognize that the immediate and specific interests of different people are different. It is necessary to understand, pay attention to, and harmonize the different interests. Similarly, the political interests are diverse and varied in a socialist society. The expression of different economic interests in politics--through meetings of people's representatives, propaganda media, decisions and laws--will lead to diversified political interests.

We should respect objectivity and reality. In the process of reform, we should pay attention to the requirements of objective realities.

We should recognize that as real life develops, the theoretical structure of Marxism will become inadequate, and must be supplemented and developed according to the requirements of the new period.

For example, traditional Marxist theory lacks in social-psychological studies. As a result, we have failed in both theory and practice to solve the question of driving force for the development of socialist society. According to the traditional theory, once the proletariat and the working people have won political power and "become masters," their enthusiasm for production will "erupt like a volcano." However, volcanic eruptions cannot go on forever and will come to a stop after a while. We cannot hope to rely on the masses' revolutionary fervor in the early post-liberation days to carry out long-term, arduous construction work. Therefore, it is necessary to study social psychology and how to develop the motive force. Unless this problem is solved, we will not be able to find out the reason why the socialist countries' labor productivity and production efficiency have been lower than those of the developed capitalist countries for a long time.

It is necessary for the Marxist methodology to critically assimilate modern systematics methods and other scientific methods. Only in this way will it give us greater help in grasping the complicated and varying process of reform and in understanding the constantly changing external world.

It is equally necessary to develop the Marxist theories on states, classes, and nations. Under the new conditions, it is necessary not only to consider the state's class nature, but to study its social character. In the new society, the old exploiting classes have disappeared, and new social strata

have emerged. It is necessary to reconsider the classical definitions of "classes."

Only by developing Marxism, can we adhere to Marxism.

The reform of the political system should be the integration of theory with practice and the unity of ideals with realities.

Marxists are idealists. Marx saw the future society as an "association of free people," a new social community free of all forms of alienation. What we aspire after is not "democracy" which comes as a favor from above, but socialist democracy, real people's democracy. Reform is to set free the talent, creativity and progressive spirit of every individual.

Marxists are also realists. We should fully estimate the difficulties and limits to the reform of the political system and deal with all the contradictions, problems, temporary compromises, and necessary concessions which we have to face in a realistic and tactful way. The constitution has provided for extensive people's democracy. We should strive to really achieve the rights to democracy and freedom stipulated in the constitution and correct and eliminate all the factors which are not in keeping with the spirit of the constitution. We cannot expect all our wishes to come true overnight. We can only proceed in a down-to-earth way and step by step in reforming the political system. Our orientation is modernization and democratization. The two are inseparable. Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, we have made a good beginning, but it is far from perfect. Owing to China's heavy historical burden, the road toward modernization and democracy is bound to be rough and bumpy. But this orientation is dictated by history and is irreversible.

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YAN JIAQI DISCUSSES POLITICAL REFORM

Hong Kong CHIUSHIH NIENTAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese No 203, Dec 86 pp 40-47

[Article by Ch'iu Ch'ui-liang [6726 0987 0081]: "Yan Jiaqi Discusses Political Structure and Political Reform"; Yan Jiaqi is director of the Political Science Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; article dated 25 Oct 86]

[Text] "If the Cultural Revolution is repeated in China, it will be disastrous. If we fail to summarize its lessons, it will also be disastrous. If, after summarizing the lessons, we fail to build an advanced democracy, it will likewise be disastrous."

In 1952, under the influence of the Soviet model, Mao Zedong reorganized collegiate education and the research mechanisms of mainland China and, by one stroke of the pen, abolished political science. For this reason, in a long hiatus of almost 3 decades, China had no specialization in political science. Not until the end of the catastrophic Cultural Revolution and after the death of Mao Zedong did Deng Xiaoping reinstate the discipline. Inexplicably, political issues and political science research were regarded as forbidden zones, too sensitive for discussion. In the past 5 years or more, China's universities have begun to establish political science department. However, teachers and researchers are nowhere to be found, and there is a dearth of professional books and academic publications. In China's academic realm, political science is a desert that is just coming to life.

Like a miracle, after China's political scientists Qian Duansheng [6929 4551 3932] and Xiao Gongquan [5618 0361 2938] from the 1930's to the 1950's, several fairly authoritative political scientists in their thirties and forties, e.g., Wang Huning [3769 3337 1380] (of Fudan University, praised as China's youngest political science associate professor), have actually emerged out of nowhere. It is indeed amazing.

This is particularly true with the 44-year old Yan Jiaqi [0917 1367 0366]. His recently published a series of comments and writings pertaining to China's political reform and his two recent masterpieces, "On Leaders" and History of China's 10-year Cultural Revolution," have created a wave



of "Yan Jiaqi vibrations," and have clearly propelled him to the most authoritative ranks in China's political science field. It is said that he has rapidly advanced to the "great master's rank." Perhaps it is premature to call him a great master, but many people agree that he has the capacity and the potential to become a national or world-class authority.

Doubtless, Yan Jiaqi is the strongest, most active, and most influential political scientist supporting China's current political reform. In expounding and spreading the theories of political reform, his are the footfalls in an empty valley signifying reason, explicitness, clarity, and strength.

The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is the highest social science research organ in China. After 5 years of preparation, its political science institute was formally established in July last year. As its first director at age 43, Yan Jiaqi is 1 year younger than Liu Zaifu [0491 0375 1788], another "star" director, who was appointed in the same year to head the Institute of Literature.

Yan Jiaqi graduated from the China Science and Technology University in 1964, majoring in physical mathematics. He declared: "My natural science education in college makes me automatically regard political phenomena and political systems as objects of scientific research." His famous words are that science is a world of "three no's": no forbidden zones, no idols, and no limits.

After college, he passed the entrance examinations for the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy. During the Cultural Revolution, he had already collected information and studied the political systems of the various nations in the world. He published the book "State System" in 1982. After 6 years of effort, he and his wife Gao Gao [7559 4108], also with the Social Science Academy, completed "History of China's 10-year Cultural Revolution." With "On Leaders" researched and written at the same time and articles published in HONGOI, ZHENGZHIXUE YANJIU, and WENHUI BAO, the academic writings of the past 5 years of this young political scientist, who changed his profession midway, can be considered rich in both quality and quantity and command admiration.

Besides the "three no's," Yan Jiaqi made two other famous statements: "Only open countries dare study political science." "If the issues of political systems cannot serve as the objects of research, then one cannot begin to talk about any effective reform."

During the past August through October, this writer made a study trip to mainland China and discussed the issues of China's political reform with research fellows, professors, and graduate students in international politics and political science at Beijing, Fudan, and Hangzhou Universities. I decided beforehand that the persons I was most anxious to talk with were Director Su Shaozhi [5685 4801 2535] of the Social Science



Academy's Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Institute, and Yan Jiaqi and Wang Huning.

I spent two mornings with Yan Jiaqi in rigorous academic discussions. I found that he is a political scientist with enlightenment, erudition, clarity, and precision in thinking and with considerable understanding and points in common in terms of democracy.

The following is arranged from the tape of our second conversation (23 September). Besides some slight revisions of wording and deletions of repetitions, I have kept intact as much as possible the original conversation. Nevertheless, the material was not checked by Yan Jiaqi prior to publication, and I am responsible for any errors.

#### Human Nature and Systems

"For a long time, China places its trust in good leaders. I feel that the starting point of systematization is recognition of man's imperfections and flaws, but China has no such concept."

Ch'iu Ch'ui-liang: At a certain level, we two are "Eastern (Chinese) and "Western" political scientists. I basically believe in the freedom and democracy of the West. I feel that, as society has, because of the growth of productive forces and changes in production relations, developed from traditional to modern, this modern society is bound to be relatively rational, pluralistic, and democratic and will follow the rule of law. I have considerable criticisms of both Marxism and capitalism. Besides historical material determinism and the theories on the selfishness of human nature and on market economy, there are immutable and transcendent freedom, equality, universal love, justice, and humanitarianism, forming the system of basic human values. I feel that in man's history, the 20th century is the century of nationalism. The fight against colonialism and imperialism, the struggle for national independence and the creation of independent countries are the historical trend. Meanwhile, the 21st century will very possibly be the era when the people strive to be the true masters. After studying comparative governments for more than 2 decades, I believe that only when the people are the masters and democracy is implemented will the people gain the maximum culture of freedom, equality, universal love, civil rights, and humanitarianism.

Probably you are basically a Marxist political scientist, but your advocacy of the "three no's" and "scientific study of political issues" in terms of political reform seems to be pretty close to mine and is acceptable to me. Let us discuss some issues of concern in terms of these points in common.

Yan Jiaqi: China's political reform has been engendered from objective needs. It has been said that China must never have another Cultural Revolution, and that if the Cultural Revolution is repeated in China, it will be disastrous to the Chinese people. If we fail to summarize its lessons, it will also be disastrous. If, after summarizing the lessons,

we fail to build democracy and the rule of law, it will likewise be disastrous to the Chinese people. The building of an advanced democracy in China requires yet a formidable and protracted course. The abolition of the CPC chairmanship and the decision on the term system of the highest government leaders in 1982 were important steps on the road to democracy.

Nevertheless, it is still inadequate. Therefore, I endorse Deng Xiaoping's words. He said: Why do some things happen in socialist but not in capitalist countries? This question needs to be studied and demonstrated. To do so, we must completely open our culture to the outside. I feel that a complete cultural opening must not be limited to the introduction of Western science and technology, but must also include Western political and social theories, its doctrines on the separation of power and checks and balances, and its views and practices on the people's greater participation in politics. Likewise with Marxism, many theories and doctrines are man's valuable cultural products.

In recent centuries, there were two approaches in our inquiry into society: concern over social issues, and concern over state and political issues. Those taking the former, such as Thomas More, believed that the reform of the social system would provide a fairly perfect living environment to man, and those taking the latter, such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Voltaire, followed a different path and felt that the reform of the political system was extremely important to the state and the people. Originally, the two trends did not converge entirely. Not until Marx was there the tendency to converge. According to Marx, to reform society, relying on utopianism alone to appeal to capitalists and the ruling class will not work; we must rely on political reform and let the proletariat control political power. However, after Marx, the study of the history of man's thinking again branched. Some people felt that social changes alone would solve the problems. They failed to give proper attention to political changes. I find that it was thus with Stalin and Mao Zedong: They believed that society would gradually improve with socialist reform alone and paid no serious attention to political reform. Furthermore, traditional culture considered China the center of the world and had little conception of comparative politics. Many people in Chinese history, e.g., Huang Zongxi [1584 1632] and Deng Mu [1672 1742], severely criticized feudalism, but never gave any thought to building a better political system outside China's traditional feudal system. But it is different with the Western world. Aristotle, for instance, made comparisons of the different states, proposed the concept of comparative politics, and searched for and pursued a better system.

For a long time, China placed its trust in good leaders and its hopes in honest bureaucrats, wise monarchs, and people of noble character. Deng Xiaoping's thinking is different. He declared: A good system will make it impossible for evildoers to do what they please; a bad system will make it impossible for evildoers to do what they please; a bad system will make it impossible for good people to do good deeds, and they may even take the opposite path and do bad deeds. We must use systems to restrict people. I feel that it is the starting point of systematization. We

must admit man's imperfections and flaws. Man is imperfect. China has no such concept. If China does not free itself from the influence of traditional political ethics, it is impossible for it to progress and modernize. We have just begun to have this understanding and to discuss the issue in the ideological and theoretical community, but many people are still unable to accept it. Take the XINXING writer Ke Yunlu [2688 7189 6424], for instance: Even while condemning bureaucratism, he fails to understand the relations between bureaucratism and traditional culture. Finding good leaders remains his conception.

#### Origin and Bottleneck of Political Reform

"I have discovered a bottleneck in China's political reform: Some people insist that to overcome the difficulties confronting economic reforms, China must launch political reform, but it must not involve changes in the system; it can only reform the administrative structures and functions of the government."

Ch'iu: China began the four modernizations program in 1978. The production contract responsibility system introduced in rural economic reforms has made considerable achievements, but the urban economic reforms initiated 2 years ago have not produced obvious results and are facing a series of problems. Some people have begun to discover that the four modernizations include no political modernization and that in the absence of political reforms, economic reforms will not work. Like rising winds and driven clouds, people have begun to discuss political reforms. Is it true that economic reforms cannot be achieved in the absence of political reforms?

Yan: The hopes for China's reforms rest in simultaneous efforts in politics and economics. The path is very difficult. It appears that we have only recently started to discuss the issue of political reforms, but actually it was brought up a long time ago. However, in terms of the present, economic reforms urgently need political reforms. The issues here are quite specific: China's numerous and chaotic systems, the confusion in structures and functions, and the layers of problems. Therefore, short of political reforms, it is impossible to develop economic reforms further. Nevertheless, the purpose of political reforms is not merely to ensure the smooth progress of economic reforms but also to build a highly democratic socialist state, which is a greater goal. Thus, the view that political reforms must only be launched when economic reforms can no longer proceed further is not completely accurate.

Ch'iu: It thus involves a more basic issue. I came to mainland China this time to study its political reforms and have discovered a bottleneck: Some people insist that to overcome the difficulties confronting economic reforms, China must launch political reform, but it must not involve changes in the system; it can only solve the problems by reforming the administrative structures and functions of the government. It seems to focus on the art of administration, solving within its perimeter the various problems in China's political system for the purpose of improving the efficiency of the government. It appears to be treating the symptoms

but not the cause. Precisely as you said, China is a relatively traditional society under the rule of man, and the key issue to its modernization is to change to the rule of law. The main purpose of systematizing the rule of law, as you mentioned, is to avoid the inevitable corrupt phenomena of power abuse and the long concentration of power under the rule of man, and the key issues are the distribution of power and checks and balances.

I recently made a study of political science in China since its reinstatement in 1980. I find that it basically remains at the phase of static Western political science of the 1940's and 1950's, and mainly focuses on the structure and functions of the government. According to my understanding, your recent "On Leaders" is a study of political behavior and phenomena from the angle of power distribution and can be considered a breakthrough and an innovative development in China's dynamic political science. In most Western introductory texts, the very first chapter discusses the definition, nature, exercise, distribution, and corruption of power.

Yan: Yes, the first part of my book deals with the issues of power.

#### Distribution of Power

Ch'iu: Does this development demonstrate that political science in China has finally begun to realize that political reforms are bound to involve the issues of a rational power distribution and checks and balances in the system? Be it the socialist or the Western free and democratic political system, the issues of power are basically identical. Therefore, China today likewise cannot avoid the necessity of a rational distribution of power and the building of check and balance mechanisms. Only thus will the problems be basically solved, and the state of advanced democracy mentioned by you achieved.

Yan: In terms of political reform, my personal view is that it has a short- and a long-term goal. In discussing politics, we must start from reality and refrain from idle talk. What is the feasibility of political reform? If impossible to be achieved in reality, our good ideals do not have much meaning. There are innumerable instances in history, e.g., the French constitution proposed by (Xieyasi) in 1799. The purpose was to build a system of checks and balances. However, it took only 1 day for it to change color and was at once vetoed by Napoleon. Therefore, we must come up with a feasible program.

Today, China's political reform can only proceed step by step. First of all, we must solve the incompatibilities of the political system with economic reforms, primarily the separation of party from government, the separation of government from industries, the leader responsibility system, and the terms of office. These issues require immediate attention. Ultimately, the building of an advanced democratic system mentioned by you is of course important. The problem is that the reform of the system has to involve the revision of the constitution. Today, conditions for

a constitutional revision are not present, and it can only be a long-term goal. Short- and long-term goals should follow their orders of priority and urgency and be pursued gradually. If we undertake a cause which can only be accomplished 10 years hence, it will create no benefit, but only add to the difficulties, and we will not succeed.

Only after undergoing the Great Cultural Revolution has China begun to discuss openly the reform of the political system. In the 1950's, it could not be mentioned; whoever mentioned it was labeled a rightist. Nor could it be mentioned in the 1960's. The focus then was on finding a perfect successor to the leader, and basically no thought was given to political reform. Today we are finally considering the issue of political reform.

Ch'iu: Only on the mainland this time did I hear of the formulation of separating the systems. In foreign countries, this way of separation is not clear. Many mainland scholars say that today's is a reform of the political system under China's socialist system.

Yan: Yes! Actually, the term system in its various forms means structure. Therefore, I feel that China's socialist political system itself has problems requiring reform, and it is doubtless true. However, it is an issue for the future. Today the separation of party from government is particularly important. If they are not separated, it will be impossible to implement the leader, plant director, and manager responsibility systems under them or for government departments to exercise power rationally.

#### Separation of Party and Government Not an Easy Matter

"It is extremely difficult to ask the powerholders to restrict their own power. Therefore, the current political reform is definitely not just administrative reforms; the separation of party and government is indivisible from political reform."

Ch'iu: These days on the mainland I hear everywhere the demand to separate party and government. At the beginning I thought it would not be difficult.

Yan: Not difficult at all!

Ch'iu: However, after hearing more views from all sides, I have discovered that the issue is not that simple.

Yan: Some days ago I took a look in Shekou and discovered that the separation of party and government was easily accomplished. You should go there to take a look when you have a chance. A responsible person there by the name of Yuan Geng [5913 1649] explained clearly in a few words the separation of party from government and that of government from industries, and they accomplished it accordingly. For some unknown reason, it becomes very complicated and theoretically confusing in the

interior. If it is so complicated and confusing, how can it be implemented? The separation of party and government means to delegate power. Today power is overly concentrated at the top. Moreover, the administrative structure must be simplified. The 1985 experiment to simplify the structure failed, especially in regard to the cadre issue.

Ch'iu: Allow me to make an interruption and present you with a difficult problem. After 1949, the CPC has played a controlling and leading role at every level of mainland China's politics, economics, society, and culture. From the high to the low, party secretaries have always had a concentration of power in them, and have served as the people's "parental magistrates." The protracted arbitrary power has led to the phenomenon of corruption today. The problem is the CPC's absolute political authority and, in the foreseeable future, there are yet no other political organizations or forces which can replace or check it. It is extremely difficult to ask the powerholders to restrict their own power. Unlike a corporation, a government department, or an economic zone like Shekou, it is not an easy matter to separate the CPC's gigantic power structure from government organs and social organizations throughout the country.

Yan: Therefore, the current political reform is definitely not just administrative reforms. I feel that the separation of party and government is indivisible from political reform. As mentioned by some people, we cannot achieve the separation of party and government by means of administrative reforms.

In this respect, many people in China today are extremely confused in their concepts, especially in regard to democracy. With such confusion, it is impossible to accomplish political reform. Therefore, theoretical explorations are very important. We must be accurate in theories, develop public opinion, and clearly collate and stipulate feasible reform programs.

The CPC is a party in power. Like the party in power of any country, it must implement its policies. Take Japan's Liberal Democratic Party for instance: Its president is also the country's prime minister, who implements the party's policies as prime minister. It is also thus with Britain's Mrs Thatcher; she will not implement the policies of the Labor Party. Thus, in terms of China's government leaders, premiers, provincial governors, and mayors, as long as they are party members, they must implement the party's policies. The meaning of separation of party and government is that they may only implement party policies in their capacity as government leaders, but may not issue orders to state and government organs in their capacity as party leaders. This distinction is extremely important.

#### Party Dictatorship and Separation of Three Powers

"The party is not the power organ of the state. The separation of party and government is the party's collective leadership and the government's leader responsibility system, and it is not yet accepted throughout the country and throughout the party."



Ch'iu: This is correct, but the issue is not that simple. The exercise of power is intricate and complex and includes countless links. There are also the examples of Japan and Britain mentioned by you: They are essentially different from China's party dictatorship. In such countries as Japan, Britain, and America, the party in power often has to confront a strong opposition and undergo a certain electoral procedure every 3 or 4 years to provide the opposition a chance to gain legitimate power. The flaw of long concentration of power is avoided by means of alternation. Moreover, what is equally important is that these countries, under the safeguard provided by the constitution, separate the powers and possess check and balance mechanisms, namely, the check and balance system under the separation of the three powers.

In Western political science, we have not yet discovered a system more effective than the separation of the three powers in avoiding corruption resulting from a concentration of power. In my contact with them, most of mainland China's political scientists understand and recognize the advantages of the separation of the three powers, but most of them also feel that the potential of its achievement is nonexistent in China today. They feel that China can only achieve inner-party democracy. We will discuss later the issue of inner-party democracy, but, as I said before, basically I feel that it is extremely difficult.

Yan: In terms of the separation of the three powers in such countries as Britain and America, they each have their different forms. I feel that the concepts of state power restrictions and checks and balances are more important than the separation of the three powers.

China's current political system has a restrictive mechanism. The people's congresses of all levels, for instance, may deliberate on and pass the laws and decrees of administrative organs and examine the work reports of courts. The examination of the work reports of courts is not found in America. I think that is an excellent idea. The problem is the People's Congress itself. The system of nominating deputies is problematic, and we have not perfected it.

Ch'iu: Not just nomination but the electoral system lacks representativeness, competition, and selection.

Yan: Problems are found in the procedures of nomination, election, deliberation, and voting on decisions. Today it is still out of the question for the NPC to be the supreme organ of state power. All power is concentrated in the party's leading stratum. Therefore, before discussing the separation of the three powers, we must first solve the issue of how to make the NPC the supreme power organ. It is the main topic of our current political reform.

There is another point in the separation of party and government: The CPC must truly achieve collective leadership. What is collective leadership? It is the abolition of the party chairmanship as I mentioned before and

the collective leadership system followed by party committees of all levels, including the Central Committee. Collective leadership means that every individual (committee member) has only the right of one vote, and the Central Secretariat serves as the Central Committee's executive (not decision-making) mechanism. The party's collective leadership means the committee system, and policies must be made by the collective; it means democracy, with the minority obeying the majority. At the provincial level, for instance, the governor may possibly serve as a deputy party secretary or party standing committee member, but the provincial party committee may not issue orders directly to the provincial government. The governor under the leader responsibility system performs the functions of administration as the governor, but in the provincial committee, he, like the secretary or other committee members, is only a member of the collective leadership. As a party member, he must obey the party's decisions and implement its policies, but as the governor, he must, in line with the principles of the leader responsibility system, respond only to the government and implement only its orders.

It is the separation of party and government; it is the party's collective leadership system and the government's leader responsibility system. Today it is not yet accepted throughout the country and throughout the party. The party is not the power organ of the state, a point which many people cannot accept. I feel that the frequent practice of the party Central Committee and the State Council issuing joint documents or orders is inappropriate and not in conformity with the constitution. The party's orders should not have a binding force on the people throughout the country; they should have a binding force only on its members.

#### Humanitarianism Above Revolution

There is also, for instance, "one country, two systems"--the "one country, two systems" of Hong Kong. How can we ask the people of Hong Kong to accept our ideology? We must acknowledge the differences in ideology and discuss unification under the principle of accepting the differences in ideology. We must not let the differences block China's progress and development.

Different ideologies should be equal before science, like the equality between the theories of Einstein and Newton, without making a distinction between superior and inferior. Likewise, in the ideological realm, Marxism and humanitarianism are both valuable achievements of man's culture.

In regard to Western political theories and administrative and management methods, we definitely can learn from and introduce them. Under our current total open-door policy, we must recognize Marxism as the science guiding our modernization and reforms, but there are also sciences, theories, and doctrines other than Marxism. All scientific theories, doctrines, and ideas are needed by our modernization program. A total cultural opening means breaking through such restrictions as "Chinese learning as the substance and Western learning as the means" and "defending the purity of Marxism"; it means introducing, digesting, and



assimilating the splendid achievements in the cultures of all mankind, including all kinds of natural and social science theories, ideas, and doctrines. Many people in China still fail to understand this point. Some people still believe that anything with the Marxist label, such as Marxist literature, Marxist political science, Marxist ethics, and Marxist aesthetics, is science. It indeed does not make much sense.

Ch'iu: I think that it is your "three no's" principle! I believe that the value system of freedom, equality, universal love, democracy, and humanitarianism transcends the boundaries of state, nation, and ideology.

Yan: They are the splendid achievements of the cultures of all mankind.

Ch'iu: As I said before, I also believe that democracy is the trend of today's historical era. On the issue of democracy, we two "Eastern (Chinese)" and "Western" political scientists should have no basic differences.

Yan: Yes. However, I do not deny that some people regard political science from the Marxist viewpoint. All disciplines have their schools of thought, and divergences are found among the schools. They may debate and develop views acceptable to all. I believe that it is thus with science, which may have different viewpoints in the course of development. In terms of Marxism as a science, it has its domain.

I have a view of Marx. In his historical materialism, especially in terms of the development of society, he regards society as a natural process. However, when it comes to the interpretation of history, especially of short-term historical development, the temperament, character, and behavior of individuals may produce a strong influence, and at times one needs to understand history in terms of such human factors. In China's Great Cultural Revolution, one may see the fairly strong links between Mao Zedong's temperament, Zhou Enlai's thinking, and Jiang Qing's life with the development of China's modern history. When human factors are omitted, it is impossible for marxism to interpret history completely. Science may progress and develop. We thought that Newton's first law was science, but subsequently Einstein studied new theories and overthrew old ones. When we discover that an existing theory cannot explain a new reality, it has to be revised. As a scientific theory, Marxism must face the same problem.

Ch'iu: What about freedom, equality, universal love, human rights, and humanitarianism?

Yan: Humanitarianism! I look at it this way: In recent years, humanitarianism has caused much debate in China. I feel that criticism of humanitarianism is opposition to man's noblest being; it cannot be criticized. What is humanitarianism? I believe it has two characteristics: First is respect for man's basic value, but just this one point is not enough, because many theories and doctrines possess this point. The second characteristic is more important: Humanitarianism's respect for

man's value, which transcends social, class, and all other differences. What does it mean? It means that humanitarianism is not the doctrine of "universal love," but must ruthlessly criticize false and despicable desires and hypocritical love.

Moreover, humanitarianism transcends revolution. In Hugo's ("Year 93"), to save three little children, a counterrevolutionary opposed to the French Revolution was put in jail. Deeply moved by his act, the revolutionary commander released him and put himself in jail in his place. Hugo declared that there is humanitarianism above revolution.

Many among us credit all good things to the name of Marx. It is not right. Humanitarianism transcends Marxism. Thus, in the arguments a while ago, all those opposing humanitarianism were censured by the Chinese people. Comrade Qang Ruoshui [3769 5387 3055] should be considered a hero. He and Li Honglin [2621 3163 2651] are both heroes in China's ideological and theoretical community and should receive everyone's respect.

#### Democratic Mechanism and Democratic Party Government

"All democratic parties in China have programs in support of the CPC. Therefore, it is not a competitive relationship between the democratic parties and the CPC, but a cooperative system with the CPC as the core."

Ch'iu: The Sixth Plenary Session of the party Central Committee did not formally include political reform in its agenda. Reportedly the Central Committee leaders are placing it at present in an undecided stage, pending investigation and study. It seems that many people have objections to it.

Yan: As I said before, political reform is closely linked with the Great Cultural Revolution. If there were people prior to the Cultural Revolution who discussed political reform, democracy, separation of power, and checks and balances, even if the Cultural Revolution did occur, it would not have reached such a tragic extent.

By bringing liberation to the Chinese people after a long struggle, the CPC enjoyed a fairly high prestige. However, it allowed the Great Cultural Revolution to happen and made serious errors, and its prestige suffered. How can it still hold back on political reform today?

I look at democracy this way: Democracy is teamwork. Deciding or revising government policies directly or indirectly in accordance with predetermined procedures is democracy. I think it is acceptable to you. It is said that, because of the low cultural level of the people, China cannot practice democracy, but I do not endorse this view.

Ch'iu: I also oppose it strongly.

Yan: Ancient Greece practiced democracy, but its cultural level could not compare with ours. At the time of the French Revolution, its cultural

level was also below ours. Therefore, it is baseless to say that China cannot achieve democracy because of low cultural level.

Democracy requires a mechanism for the rule of law, systematization, and established procedures. Though it is elementary political knowledge, there are still people in China who fail to understand it and who disagree.

Ch'iu: In terms of a democratic mechanism, though as you mentioned the CPC has 40 million members while the 8 other democratic parties only 200,000, and a two-party or multiparty system is basically impossible, should the state constitution explicitly stipulate such a mechanism and established procedures? In the future, perhaps the far future, China may by means of electoral procedures, engender an effective democratic party government.

Yan: According to my understanding, all democratic parties in China have programs in support of the CPC. Therefore, it is not a competitive relationship between the democratic parties and the CPC. China's political system today is a multiparty cooperative system with the CPC as the core. Perhaps after unification, the Kuomintang may hold political views different from the CPC, and their relationship may be different, and so may the conditions.

As with separation of the three powers, it is still premature to discuss a two-party or multiparty system. Realistically speaking, besides improving the collective leadership system by means of inner-party democracy, another similarly important thing today is to perfect the democratic mechanism of the NPC. In this respect I have a conception: I suggest changing the NPC to the people's parliament. Members of the parliament must be professional political activists; the parliament must hold regular meetings to deliberate laws proposed by the state; members must regularly supervise the activities of the government; and members are selected by gradual direct election by the people, and they must respond to voters.

I know how Shekou holds elections: Candidates must express their political views to voters, and voters may pose questions. In the primaries, 18 candidates among several hundred were selected by voting. These 18 candidates had to campaign for election and express their views on the management of Shekou. Thereafter, nine were selected by a vote to form the Shekou management committee. The committee also follows the practice of no-confidence voting. A member must step down if he fails to win a specified number of votes. Tianjin is also in the course of adopting this progressive practice. They have borrowed much from the experience of Western democratic countries. Therefore, I think China's political reform should be divided into two parts. The first is in terms of the near future and includes separation of party and government, delegation of power, simplification of the administrative structure, and improvement of efficiency. The second is in the long term, namely, building a highly democratic political system.

## Issue of Unification

"I think 'one country, two systems' is feasible. To change the NPC to a people's parliament means to permit the people of Taiwan and Hong Kong to participate in the national power structure and exercise political power."

Ch'iu: Let us return to the issue of unification. You have made quite a study of "one country, two systems" and published many articles in HONGQI.

I do not think Taiwan will accept "one country, two systems," because if they do, they will lose their political independence. Recently Canada's Professor Hsiao Hsin-i [5618 2946 5030] published an article on the "German model." The "German model" is not acceptable to China, and "one country, two systems" is not acceptable to Taiwan. My conception is whether it is possible to find a way out between the two, implementing the "German model" first, "one country, two systems" next, and unification after a fairly long interval.

Yan: I think the first thing to do is to start a dialogue between the two sides of the strait, namely, the three opens. The purpose is to leave ideologies aside. Thereafter Taiwan may propose its form of unification, and we ours. It is feasible. Dialogues are not limited to the Kuomintang and CPC. Taiwan's extraparty faction may also hold dialogues with us, as well as with industrial figures and political scientists. Political scientists of the two sides will have a common language. We may discuss the distribution of power and checks and balances, as well as democratic politics and democratic mechanisms. I believe Taiwan will have no objections.

At the International Political Science Association meeting last time and this time, we were extremely anxious to meet and talk with Chang Ching-yu [1728 0079 5148] and Shao Yu-ming [6730 3768 6900], but they seemed to have misgivings and were unwilling to talk with us. We had no "assignment" in trying to talk with them; neither the higher level nor the academy had asked us to do so. I have not been asked by the academy or other organs to talk with you today. We can discuss anything. It would have been impossible 5 years ago, let alone 10.

Ch'iu: When I came to the mainland 5 years ago, I could not talk like this.

Yan: I think "one country, two systems" is feasible. Under this plan, the people and leaders of Taiwan may take part in China's central power structure and exercise political power. It will not work otherwise. My suggestion to change the NPC to a people's parliament is to permit the people of Taiwan and Hong Kong after unification to participate in China's national power structure and exercise political power.

In addition, I want to point out another thing. Under "one country, two systems," there is a relationship of equality between the Kuomintang and the extraparty faction. The Kuomintang must abolish martial law and build a democratic political system with the extraparty faction. The latter has made considerable contributions to Taiwan's democracy. We have noticed their struggle and effort in the fight for freedom of speech and the checks and balances of power. I think they are amazing. As for Taiwan independence, I think it will not get anywhere. The U.S. government no longer supports them. The Taiwan independence movement is a product of Kuomintang's poor administration.

Ch'iu: Is a two-party system of the Kuomintang and CPC after unification possible?

Yan: It will require constitutional revisions and may be possible in the long run, but not at present. The long-term view is only a forecast, and whether it will occur will depend on practical conditions at the time. Perhaps the next generation will accept our conception more readily.

There is plenty of scope for China's political science. At present we still have difficulties, but political science in the universities has produced strong reactions.

#### Cultural Revolution and the Norms of Leaders

Ch'iu: Political science graduates and undergraduates I have met are fairly lively and vivacious. I agree with your view.

All right, let us shift to your two masterpieces published recently, "History of China's 1--year Cultural Revolution" and "On Leaders." Before they became available in bookstores, they had already created a national sensation.

Yan: All copies of "On Leaders" formally issued a few days ago have been sold out. I will give you a copy today. A few days ago I personally presented a copy to Zhao Ziyang. "Ten-year Cultural Revolution" has only recently been serialized in Hong Kong's TA KUNG PAO, and reportedly has attracted much attention. I have a few installments on hand. The pictures are well matched and very pertinent to the subject.

Ch'iu: Both books are breakthroughs in China's political science. Let us discuss "10-year Cultural Revolution" first. According to my understanding, what causes controversy in the book is the following: It bluntly points out that, in the CPC regime in the decade or more prior to the Cultural Revolution, the following factors--namely, 1) in economics, purposeless planning, distribution of economic resources by administrative means, and total neglect of the laws of the market; 2) in politics, lack of distinction between party and government and overcentralization of power; and 3) in ideology and culture, a personality cult and the absence of freedom of speech, thinking, and creation--made the disaster inevitable in the economic, political, social, and cultural systems. In other words,

Mao Zedong's practices after the founding of the nation in 1949 planted the evil seeds of the Cultural Revolution. Most likely these words are unacceptable to many party members. It is truly a bold formulation in mainland China.

Yan: The occurrence of the Cultural Revolution was because China after 1949 came under two influences: China's traditional feudal autocratic politics and culture, and the Soviet model. Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, in particular, came deeply under the Soviet influence. Therefore, interpreting China's political system by means of the traditional feudal autocracy is inadequate. The overcentralization of power was linked with traditional feudalism, but the power struggles between Mao and Lin and the gang of four were extremely brutal. Why did Lin Biao want to attack Mao Zedong with a rocket when the latter toured the Southeast? Why was the gang of four so ruthless against Liu Shaoqi? One can see the Soviet influence here.

Of course, we are still too close in time to the Cultural Revolution and not in a position to make historical assessments of many things. In writing this book, we have recorded the facts in a most responsible manner. After working on it for 6 years, it is being published. I am glad that no higher-up has intervened. When the publisher (Tianjin People's Publishing House) asked whether the manuscript should be cleared with the higher authorities (presumably the Central Propaganda Department), I said no. It is probably the first time in many years that a book of such a sensitive political nature is published without scrutiny above. The Foreign Language Publishing House telephoned yesterday, saying that it wanted to seek instructions from the higher level on translating it, but I said that I personally disagree. Wang Ruoshui's new book "In Defense of Humanitarianism" was also published without clearance from above.

Ch'iu: Maybe it was for this very reason that Wang Ruoshui's book was not available in Xinhua Bookstores. I bought it at a bookstall next to Beijing University.

Yan: China's constitution stipulates the people's freedom of publication. Previously one must seek instructions from above in regard to such writings. It is incorrect. If one has to seek instructions on everything, how can the country develop?

Ch'iu: I have two questions in regard to "On Leaders." First, why does the book not include leaders of socialist countries?

Yan: There is an essential distinction in leaders of socialist countries. I feel that, by omitting them, I can make a more penetrating analysis. Of course I have no wish to evade the issue. The "10-year Cultural Revolution" explicitly describes and incisively probes the conduct of the leaders of China's socialism. Leaders of socialist countries probably will have to be discussed separately.

Ch'iu: My second question is: After studying the exercise of power and changes of over 460 heads of state and government leaders of various countries, what is your most important conclusion?

Yan: My book lists 20 norms for the conduct of heads of state and mentions such conceptions as formulating a transcendent basic law to restrict their power, defining the basic principles of the constitution, prohibiting life tenure, and so forth. One point is that changes of members of the highest power stratum and heads of supreme administrative organs must be synchronized. It is explained in detail in the book. Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese political system has this mechanism. Only with such a mechanism will the separation of power and checks and balances be achieved.

#### Yan's Conclusion

Yan: Let me add a few words. The reform of the economic system cannot depend on political reform alone. The economic system itself has problems, but some people are still not clear about this point. The reform of the ownership system and the relations of the planned economy with the market economy, for instance, still have to be studied. Some people feel that once political reform is accomplished, the economy will right itself. It is impossible. China's political reform has many problems, but the trend of its modernization and democratization is irresistible. It is the tide of history.

Finally, I wish to conclude our conversation with a few quotations from "On Leaders."

With the progress of society, the norms of the political system will also ceaselessly evolve. The norms regarded as good today may reveal all kinds of serious flaws tomorrow. Thus, new and more perfect ones will replace the old. To date, the political systems of all nations in the world are rigidly stratified pyramidal power structures. We can foresee that, in man's third millenium, with the advance of information technology, the structure of the political system will take on a brand-new form, and by that time, mankind will create brand-new norms appropriate to it. What is difficult for us to foretell is whether, in the middle period of the third millenium, the human society will still have leading figures controlling the supreme administrative power. By then, people may discover that "On Leaders" in the 8th decade of the 20th century is merely an ancient record of the era of man's "pyramidal power structure."

#### Author's Postscript

Obviously, while he has a profound understanding of the theories of democracy, Yan Jiaqi still faces many insurmountable bottlenecks in terms of the development of China's democratic politics. He clearly understands the corruption of power, the tenets and principles of the rational distribution and restriction of power, and checks and balances, and proposes 20 fairly complete norms for the conduct of leaders. However, on the momentous issue of China's political reform today, he can only cite the

immature, problematical and seriously limited model of Yuan Geng's Shekou. Moreover, on such important issues as judicial independence, party politics, and freedom of speech, he has not been able to propose formulation on the nature of democratic breakthroughs.

Nevertheless, besides Su Shaozhi, Yan Jiaqi is a political scientist who is able to discuss sensitive political issues in the most rational, enlightened, and profound manner met by the author during this trip to mainland China.

Reportedly, under Zhao Ziyang's personal leadership, China's State Council has recently created a political reform office, and Yan Jiaqi has been put in charge.

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XIA ZHENGNONG DISCUSSES POLITICAL STRUCTURAL REFORM

Shanghai MINZHU YU FAZHI [DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL SYSTEM] in Chinese No 10,  
20 Oct 86 pp 33-34

[Interview with Xia Zhongnong [1115 1794 6593] by Jian Yaochun [3068 5069 2504]: "Political Structural Reform Is the Strong Guarantee for the Development of Productive Forces and the Realization of the Four Modernization Construction; An Interview With Comrade Xia Zhongnong, Member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Political Structural Reform Is the Socialist System's Way of Self-perfection

Report: Sir, in your article entitled "We Still Need Democracy," submitted to this journal in March, you discussed the restructuring of the economic system. You suggested that stimulating the economy and liberalizing the political system to bring out the enthusiasm of the enterprises and the zeal of the workers is the guiding principle for economic reform. Compared to the restructuring of the economic system, does the present situation call for the reform of the political system with the same sense of urgency?

Zhongnong: Yes. As Comrade Deng Xiaoping said recently, each step the economic reform takes increases the urgency of political structural reform. We are in a transition between the old and the new era; as the economic structural reform develops further and further, political structural reform becomes more imminent; we have reached the point of no return in this historical trend. We implement political structural reform to improve and perfect the system of socialist party and socialist government leadership and administration, and to prevent the reenactment of the "cultural revolution" in any form, and to guarantee our long-term political stability and steady economic growth. However, ideologically, we must clarify several issues:

First, political structural reform is the socialist system's way of self-perfection. All reforms must abide by the four basic principles; we must not deviate from the socialist track, and we must never damage or destroy the socialist system. Experience and time have proven that only socialism can save China; only socialism can deliver us from backwardness and poverty, and

lead us to prosperity. The party Central Committee has repeatedly emphasized reform; it is hoped that through reform, we can make the most of the superiority of socialism. All social systems require time to become better systems, and the socialist system is no exception. Socialism has been established in China for only a little over 30 years, and having made serious mistakes like the "cultural revolution," naturally there are many flaws in our system. We need to improve those imperfections which are not compatible with the development of productive forces. Our party has the ability, and the confidence, to perfect the socialist system through reform.

Secondly, like economic structural reform, political structural reform also aims to develop the productive forces in society. In the past, our party made mistakes in its guiding ideologies; for a long time, we emphasized class struggles and neglected construction, and as a result a serious situation developed where the productive relations, the superstructures, and the productive forces became misaligned; this hindered the development of the productive forces. The party's Third Plenary Session rectified that mistake, and shifted the emphasis of its tasks to economic construction. This calls for reforms; we need to restructure those productive relations and superstructures which are not compatible with the development of productive forces. Without reform, we have no future. Therefore, when we consider any kind of reform, we should first consider whether it facilitates the liberation of the productive forces, the development of society's productive forces, and the growth of our socialist commodity economy, and whether it contributes to the stability and unity of the country to generate a lively and energetic political environment which is free but disciplined, democratic but centralized.

Furthermore, the key to reform lies in fully mobilizing the enthusiasm of the people. To develop the productive forces, we must rely on science and technology on the one hand, and we must mobilize the people's initiative and creativity on the other hand. The key to accomplishing the latter task lies in streamlining and decentralizing the political system, and strengthening democracy, including political and economic democracy, so that every member of society can feel that he is his own master, materialistically and politically, and that everybody conscientiously makes the best effort to contribute to the country's four modernizations.

Reporter: Where should political structural reform begin?

Zhengnong: Reform of the political system is a very complicated and very sensitive issue; we must not rush headlong into mass action; we must implement changes in a planned and systematic way, from the top level down. Under the present conditions, we must deal with the following problems first:

1. The failure to separate party and government, overly centralized power, and overly rigid control: these factors not only affect the ability of the government to function, they also affect the ability of the party to guide major political decisions and principles, and they also affect the construction of the party itself.
2. The government organs are cumbersome; the administrative levels are redundant; there is a lack of definite authority and duty, and an absence of clear responsibilities; there is redtape at every level, but no attempt to take responsibility, and job performance is inefficient.

3. Administrative discipline is lax, and there is no work attendance record system; there is no precise work procedure, or established procedures are ignored; there is no attempt to distinguish right from wrong, and no fairness in meting out rewards and punishments: being right or wrong, working more or less, makes little difference under the system. Promotion or dismissals of cadres are solely dependent on the supervisor's personal impressions: this dampens the cadre's zeal and motivation. Of course, there are many other problems, but I think the three mentioned so far urgently need to be solved, and they can be solved. When these problems are solved, we can mobilize the enthusiasm and the creativity of the units and the individual workers, and launch other reforms; then we can curtail bureaucratism, and improve work efficiency, and then our socialist political system will be more democratic and scientific.

#### Failure To Initiate Political Structural Reform Will Hinder the Development of the Productive Forces and Impede the Four Modernizations

Reporter: Our society has developed to the point where the restructuring of the economic system and the political system are converging in time and space in history: how would political reforms affect society's productive forces?

Zhengnong: According to Marxist theory, there exists a unity of opposites relationship between the superstructure and the economic base. The economic base determines the superstructure; a specific superstructure is built on the compatible economic base, and in turn serves that economic base. The economic base and the superstructure are constantly contradicting each other and constantly adapting to each other. The restructuring of the economic system is encountering all kinds of conflicts, for example, in the failure to separate party and government: too often the party takes over too much of the government's work and responsibilities, and the government's power and authorities; there are conflicts between the attempt to enliven the economy and the over-centralization of power: enterprises are over-regulated, their activities are constantly being restricted; and there are conflicts between the economics departments which emphasizes results and the party and government departments which are inefficient, and while the production departments have firmly inculcated in their people the concepts "times is money," and "efficiency is life," many in the party and government organs still have little idea of their responsibilities, and many are dilatory and full of bureaucratic style. These conflicts must be resolved through reform of the political system. Restructuring of the economic system must give rise to reforms in the political system, otherwise, reform will not last. Political structural reform will accelerate the development of society's productive forces. Comrade Xiaoping said, when he met with (Zhuruyisheng), failure to initiate political structural reform will hinder the development of the productive forces and impede the four modernization constructions.

The Long Term Goal of the Political Structural Reform Is To Establish a Highly Democratic Socialist Political System, and a Scientific Policy Decision System

Reporter: Some comrades suggest that the reason some socialist countries are susceptible to political upheavals is because their power structure is

irrational, their democratic system flawed, and their people have no political voice; in order to establish a highly socialistic democracy, first, the people's voice must be heard, and through political reforms, the people must become more knowledgeable about the country's political life, so that they can truly enjoy their rights as masters of their own country: sir, what is your opinion?

Zhengnong: I think the basic goal of political structural reform is to establish a highly democratic socialist political system, and a scientific system of policy decisions. The cultural revolution was partly the result of a political system which was less than democratic. In a socialist country like ours, democracy, or the lack of it, will directly affect the country's major policy decisions and economic developments. A country, or a region, without political democracy may achieve temporary economic prosperity, but long term progress cannot be maintained under that condition. We must utilize legal means to protect the people's democratic rights, and allow the people to participate, directly or indirectly, in the country's routine decisions; give the citizens the freedom to discuss political affairs, and increase their participation in politics, so that ever so many of them will join the mighty torrent of reforms as protagonists: then the nation's four modernizations certainly can be accomplished as planned, and our country will prosper and grow. But we must realize that democracy is a historical status, its development follows the development of the economy and culture. The purpose of developing democracy is to strengthen and improve the socialist system, therefore, it must have limits, and although these limits can be extended, they cannot be eliminated. Absolute democracy, unrestricted democracy, can only be realized in a communist society, but as Engels pointed out, by then nations will no longer exist, and neither will democracy.

#### Political Structural Reform Will Effectively Expedite the Establishment of China's Legal System

Reporter: I am a reporter of politics and law, so my colleagues and I are particularly interested in our legal system construction. Reform has set new tasks for the legal system, but at the same time, it has brought the legal system to a higher starting point: experience shows that the two are closely related.

Zhengnong: True, reform of the political system definitely will improve the socialist system of government, it will also set the stage for perfecting the legal system. Political structural reform will effectively expedite the establishment of our legal system. Conversely, laws will be the effective means to eliminate the resistance to political structural reform.

At present, through the political structural reform, we are making changes and putting the relationship between the party and the government in order. The state and the government should be in charge of legal matters; the party has party discipline; the government has government discipline; the nation has national laws. Those who violate party discipline should be dealt with by the

party organ, and handled by the party's disciplinary organ; those who violate government discipline should be dealt with by the government organs, and handled by the government's supervisory organ; those who broke the law should be dealt with by the judicial department. During the process of political structural reform, we must improve the state organs, normalize the workings of the state machinery, and rationalize the state machinery's division of labor; only then can we strengthen the nation's political power, which in turn will strengthen law enforcement.

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EDITORIAL URGES STUDENTS TO REJECT BOURGEOIS LIBERALIZATION

Beijing ZHONGGUO JIAOYU BAO in Chinese 10 Jan 87 p 1

[Editorial: "Make a Clean Break With Bourgeois Liberalization"]

[Text] For quite some time, there has been a flood of bourgeois liberalist ideology, and what is worth noting is that some individuals who persist in advocating bourgeois liberalization use the rostrums of our schools to distort facts, confuse right and wrong, negate the present excellent situation, and negate the line, principles, and policies determined by the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee. They vilify the party and the socialist system, nakedly advocate total Westernization, incite young students to work for a "great democracy," and stop at nothing to foment discord.

Stuff like this has never found a market among China's masses. Somewhat older people will deeply feel from personal experiences that it is only under the leadership of the CPC, and by going the socialist road, that we can have a bright and glorious future. The fact that China took the socialist road was not determined by the will of any particular person, but by China's national condition. It was a necessity of historical development and was in keeping with the fundamental interests and aspirations of the 1 billion people of China. Socialist construction in China during the past 30-odd years has been successful, though mistakes have been made. Without these mistakes, development would have been faster. Following the 10 years of turmoil, after the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee the development of today's favorable political and economic situation has also been achieved under the leadership of the party. Though we are facing difficulties on our road of progress, though some people criticize in this or that respect, the successes throughout our history since the founding of the PRC, particularly during the last 8 years, are for everyone to see. Everybody now fully cherishes the present hard-earned state of stability and unity. The confidence that these facts have created among the people is of the following nature: Only if the course of progress marked out by the Central Committee is followed steadfastly will China be able to achieve the magnificent goal of quadrupling its gross value of industrial and agricultural output by the end of this century, and in a further few score years it will certainly be possible to build China into a strong socialist country with a high level of culture and democracy. Individuals who are out to advocate such trash as "complete Westernization," we are sure, will be rebuffed and cast aside.

However, the false ideological concepts spread by those advocating bourgeois liberalization may have an effect on some of the young students who lack basic Marxist knowledge and practical social experience, who do not understand China's national condition, and who think they understand, but actually do not understand, the world situation. They still lack powers of discernment in these matters and are easily fooled. Recently, a small group of students under the influence of these falsehoods engaged in extremist activities.

Our student youth is much concerned about the ongoing reform of China's economic and political system. This is quite natural because the reform closely affects the fate of every Chinese, including that of our young students. Our party and government also encourage students to take an interest in the affairs of state. In taking an interest in the affairs of state and in the reform, it is most important to clearly recognize one's own historical responsibility, and ensure that one's every word and action is in conformance with the interests of the state, the nation, and its 1 billion people, as well as with the inevitable course of social development. To gain accurate knowledge of China's affairs and to formulate correct proposals, it is essential to have an understanding of China's reality. If one would want to put forward reform proposals in ignorance of China's history and of the actualities prevailing in China, such proposals would certainly be found unfeasible. It is for this reason that our party has recommended in recent years that our young students involve themselves in social practice. In Beijing, during last year's summer vacation, 30,000 university students participated in a variety of practical social activities. Through their participation in social practical activities, the students gained some initial knowledge of national conditions, saw the achievements of the reform, and also saw the arduous and complex nature of the reform. Actual life experiences convinced them that the current line, principles, and policies of the Central Committee are correct. They said: "A will to develop China requires, first of all, an understanding of China." "The closer one encounters the realities of society the closer one feels to the Central Committee, and the more one agrees with Comrade Deng Xiaoping's arguments." In addition to involvement in social realities, some study of Marxism-Leninism must be recommended, including study of the important documents of the Central Committee since the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, to understand how the current policies have come about, and to learn how to adopt a correct stand, viewpoint, and method in analyzing the various ideological trends in society. It is also necessary to study history, especially modern Chinese history. Only by arming oneself with the weapon of correct ideology, and with an understanding of China's history and its present reality, can one enhance one's capability of distinguishing between right and wrong, or contribute to China's construction and reform undertakings in an earnest and down-to-earth manner.

The most important thing now is to effect a clean break with bourgeois liberalization. The "Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Spiritual Civilization," adopted at the 6th Plenum of the 12th CPC Central Committee, pointed out: "Advocating bourgeois liberalization amounts to negating the socialist system and advocating the capitalist system." People who persist in advocating bourgeois liberalization spread various views among young students that run counter to



the four cardinal principles and incite young students to work for the "great democracy." Their aim, bluntly, is to abolish the leadership of the Communist Party, abolish the socialist system, and lead China onto the capitalist road. Their proposals run counter to the fundamental interests and aspirations of the 1 billion people; they are doomed to failure. Up to a short time ago, many people were not clearly aware of the dangers of bourgeois liberalization. Now people throughout the country have become fully aware. Bourgeois liberalization is indeed an ideological trend which is currently poisoning the minds of our youth, endangering social stability and unity, and disrupting the progress of our construction and reform. After realizing the true facts, most of our students will no longer be duped.

Our party fundamentally places a high value and full trust in our young students. We have always regarded the overwhelming majority of our students as good, and this includes those students who temporarily have held incorrect views on certain questions. Our young students are China's hope for the future. Party cadres and schoolteachers of all ranks should enthusiastically show solicitude for the students' healthy development, devote time to help them make a clean break with bourgeois liberalization, and have them undergo a gradual tempering so as to have them grow up and become successors who will persist in continuing on the socialist road.

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COMMENTARY URGES YOUTHS TO ACCEPT PARTY LEADERSHIP

Beijing ZHONGGUO JIAOYU BAO in Chinese 17 Jan 87 p 1

[Article by staff commentator: "Young Students Should Consciously Accept the Leadership of the Party"]

Only the CPC can lead China's revolution and construction; this is a choice of history. For over 100 years, the Chinese people have fought and laid down their lives, one stepping into the breach as another fell, and countless men of lofty ideals endured every hardship and difficulty to achieve the salvation of country and people, but it was only under the leadership of the CPC that the Chinese nation was able to raise its head and stand up in the world. The CPC gallantly fought for several decades for the democratic rights of the people. Following the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, the CPC, again, led the nation in restoring order out of chaos, in promoting various reforms and work, and in expanding socialist democracy step by step; endeavors that were crowned with enormous successes. Its natural conditions determined that there was no other road to prosperity for China than to go the socialist road and to be led by the CPC, this has been borne out repeatedly, directly and indirectly, by China's modern revolutionary history. The failure of the Revolution of 1911 resulted in the tangled warfare of warlords, and in intrusion by one foreign power after another. When the party organization ceased activities during the "Cultural Revolution," every part of the country became submerged in factional fighting. We must never forget these historical experiences and lessons.

In China, a large developing country of many nationalities, it is only by firm party leadership, a common goal, and a common ideal and discipline, that overall unity of the people can be guaranteed, and that the magnificent goal of building a modern strong socialist country can be realized. Even if the per capita national income is still relatively low, it is still possible, under the leadership of the party, with all the people working with one mind, and creating abundance from small increments, to accomplish great things, including the development of a strong national defensive strength. If the leadership of the party were to be abolished, China would again be like a sheet of loose sand and sink into chaos. In that situation, any success in revolution or construction would be out of the question. Somewhat older comrades will easily understand this truth; we hope all will help young comrades understand this truth.

Accepting the leadership of the party is an excellent tradition, which China's young students should treasure with pride. In the last few decades, generation after generation of young revolutionary intellectuals have grown up struggling along the line marked out by the party. They have given their blood, lives, and talents to compose a glorious epic of national liberation and socialist construction. When the mass of youthful students had lost correct leadership for a time during the 10 years of turmoil, they endured enormous hardships and sacrifices. In the new historical period, it is only possible under the leadership of the party and by firmly adhering to the socialist road that our young students can truly contribute to the four modernizations, establish themselves, and raise the prospects of a bright future.

There is now an extremely small group of people who flaunt the banner of "reform" and "democracy," advocate bourgeois liberalism, and by their demagoguery incite students to attack society, directing the spearhead of their attack against the party. They distort facts, confuse right and wrong, and misrepresent the party as obstructing reform and democracy. They slander the socialist undertakings of the party leadership as "failures" and absurdly try to eradicate all trust in the party among the student youth, going even so far as to proclaim the intention to "reform the party." Pretending to embrace an "ideology of liberation," they negate the guiding role of Marxism, advocate "total Westernization," and intend to draw the student youth onto a path of separation from socialism. They advocate the independence of universities from party and state, even placing themselves above party and state as the "primary bearers of responsibility for intellectual affairs and public opinion." They have appropriated the slogans of reform and development of democracy, originally proclaimed by the party, and are exploiting the impetuosity of some young students for speedier progress in reform and democratization, in order to incite them to resort to radical methods, to wrest "democracy" and "freedom" from the party. They exploit an irrational conceit among some young students, plying them with cheap but harmful flattery, instigating them to show contempt for law and discipline, to an advocacy of anarchism, and to engage in wrongdoings that endanger stability and unity. All these various activities have seriously poisoned the minds of our young students, and have, moreover, reached an alarming degree of madness!

Faced with this situation, the many young students should sharpen their vigilance, reflect coolly, and see through the evil intentions hidden under imposing slogans and enticing verbiage. Any unbiased person will clearly realize: It is the party that mobilized the people to overcome difficulties to provide the students with the precious opportunity to study, and that created excellent study and living conditions, in ardent expectation of raising the youth to become a moral, cultured, and disciplined generation of new persons. It is the party that has always placed its hope for the accomplishment of the four modernizations on the present generation of student, that has patiently applied education and guidance to those students who temporarily had been led astray or had erred, thereby demonstrating their full solicitude for them and trust in them. It was the party that fully affirmed the main current of eager advancement among students, pointing out at the same time the weakness of becoming divorced from reality, and guiding them

onto a road of healthy development. It was the party that urged students to liberate their minds, to take an interest in, and support, the reform, also providing them with the ideological guidance of Marxism, in the hope that they will firmly adhere to the correct direction in the complex situation of reform and opening up to the outside world. It is again a sign of true solicitude for our young students if the party today promptly discloses how an extremely small group of people preaches bourgeois liberalism, severance of relations between party and students, and how they in word and act vainly attempt to create social chaos, the party, therefor, is trying to prevent the young students from being drawn into upheaval and from suffering calamity. The demands of the party on young students reflect the fundamental interests of the people, conform to the trend of historical development, and are identical with the aspirations of the young students themselves, namely to become useful persons and establish themselves. The party is a close friend of the students, most deserving of their trust.

Distinctions are possible only through comparison. What is affection and what is doing harm, what is sincere advice from the bottom of one's heart and what is sugar-coated poison, who pointed the young students onto the correct road and who misled them into wrong byways, all this is not difficult to judge. The many young students should consciously listen to the call of the party, resolutely oppose the intruding wave of bourgeois liberalist ideology into our educational positions, must follow the party in forging ahead! We believe our young students will be able to stand the test of the present situation. Those who are misjudging the situation, who incite the students to direct the spearhead of attack against the party, will be spurned by most of our students in the future.

9808

CSO: 4005/366

CHILDREN OF SENIOR OFFICIALS ATTENDING FOREIGN COLLEGES

Hong Kong MING PAO YUE K'AN [MING PAO MONTHLY] in Chinese No 247, Jul 86  
pp 27-28

[Text] Since Deng Xiaoping came to power, China has been sending a large number of students overseas for further studies in order to pursue the "four modernizations." Taking advantage of the opportunity, the children of many high-ranking cadres have gone abroad in droves at public expense. A partial list has been made public:

The following departures were announced in 1981:

Deng Zhifang [6772 6347 2455]--Deng Xiaoping's youngest son. Physics Department, University of Rochester, New York, United States.

Bo Jieying [5631 3381 8714]--daughter of Bo Yibo [5631 0001 3134]. Brandeis University, Massachusetts, United States.

Liu Tingting [0491 1250 1250]--second daughter of Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei [3769 0342 5019]. Boston University, United States.

Liu Xiaoxiao [0491 3469 3469]--youngest daughter of Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei. University of Bonn, West Germany.

Chen Xiaolu [7115 1420 7627]--son of Chen Yi. University of Texas at Austin, Huang Bin [7806 6333]--son of Huang Hua [7806 5478]. Harvard University, United States.

Ye Xiaoping [0673 1420 5493]--granddaughter of Ye Jianying. Georgetown University, United States.

Zhang Andong [1728 1344 2639]--son of Zhang Jingfu [1728 0513 1133]. University of Maryland, United States.

Chen Zhongying [7115 0112 5391]--son of Chen Yun. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States.

Fang x x --son of Fang Yi [2455 3015]. Harvard University, United States.

Song Binbin [1345 1755 1755]--daughter of Song Renqiong [1345 0117 4522].  
(Ha Ba Tuo) University, United States.

In 1982:

Wang Xiaoping [3769 1420 1627]--son of Wang Xiaoyun [3769 2556 0061],  
ambassador to Japan. Sophia University, Japan.

Wu Fan [0702 0416]--son of Wu Shudong [0702 2562 2639] (counselor at the  
Chinese Embassy in Japan). Keio University, Japan.

Jin Jingyi [6855 0079 0001]--son of Jin Sucheng [6855 5685 1004] (counselor at  
the Chinese Embassy in Japan). Japanese Language School, International  
Students Institute, Japan.

Cai Xian [5591 2009]--son of Cai Jiemin [5591 1312 3046] (counselor at the  
Chinese Embassy in Japan). Japanese Language Institute, International  
Education Center, Japan.

Zhang Jingping [1728 2529 1627]--son of Zhang Jiming [1728 4949 2494]  
(counselor at the Chinese Embassy in Japan). Japanese Language School,  
International Students Institute, Kansai, Japan.

Sun Lin [1327 2651]--son of Sun Shangqing [1327 1424 3237] (deputy director of  
the Economics Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). Japanese  
Language School, International Students Institute, Kansai, Japan.

Tan Daping [6223 1129 1627]--son of Tan Qilong [6223 0796 7893]. Waseda  
University, Japan.

Fu Yiyao [4569 4135 3852]--daughter of Fu Hao [4569 3185]. Musashino Art  
University, Japan.

Hu Xiaojing [5170 1420 5464]--daughter of Hu Keshi [5170 0344 1395], (vice  
president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences). Takushoku University, Japan.

Wang Tianming [3769 1131 2494]--son of Wang Zhongfang [3769 0112 2455] (deputy  
secretary general of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences).  
Takushoku University, Japan.

Tian Hong [3944 4767]--daughter of Tian Jianong [3944 1367 6593] (vice  
chairman of the External Cultural Construction Commission.) Yamanashi Women's  
University, Japan.

Ye Hong [0673 4767]--daughter of Ye Qixiao [0673 0796 3469] (secretary at the  
Chinese Embassy in Japan.) Showa Women's University.

In 1983:

Chen Weiwei [7115 5633 5633]--daughter of Chen Kang [7115 2123] (consul-  
general in Sapporo, Japan.) Chuo University, Japan.

Wang Zunming [3769 6690 2494]--daughter of Wang Ganchang [3769 3227 2490] (director of the Nuclear Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences.) (Aushenggang) University, United States.

Sun Xiaoyan [1327 2556 3601]--granddaughter of Sun Huaping [1327 0553 1627] (vice chairman of the Chinese-Japanese Friendship Association.) Waseda University, Japan.

Chen Xiaoshan [7115 1420 0810]--granddaughter of Chen Yi. University of Rochester, United States.

Wu Qinan [0702 0366 0589]--daughter of Wu Zuoren [0702 0155 0086] (honorary president of the Central Academy of Arts.) Women's Cultural University, Japan.

In 1984:

Mei Shan [2734 1472]--son of Mei Yi [2734 4135] (secretary of the CPC committee of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,) Yu Xiaoxia's [0151 1420 7209] husband. Boston University, United States.

Yu Xiaoxia--daughter of Yu Qiuli [0151 1420 7209], Mei Shan's wife. Boston University United States.

Liu Pingping [0491 1627 1627]--daughter of Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei. PhD candidate at x University, United States.

In 1985:

Wu Jie [3527 0267]--son of Ulanfu, son-in-law of Chen Yun. Bradley University, United States.

Bo Xiangjiang [5631 3276 3068]--son of Bo Yibo. University of Massachusetts, United States.

Zhang Xiaoi [1728 1428 1947]--daughter of Zhang Aiping [1728 1947 5493]. Mary's College, California, United States.

Li Andong [2621 1344 2767]--son-in-law of Wan Li. Music Department, New York University, United States.

Shen Dongming [3088 2639 2494]--son of Shen Tu [3088 0956]. University of Wisconsin, United States.

Li Jilin [2621 1323 2651]--daughter of Li Youjiu [2621 0645 0046] (vice minister of agriculture.) Oregon State University, United States.

Zhang Wei [1728 3262]--son of Zhang Haoruo [1728 3185 5387] (deputy general manager of China Petroleum Corporation). Whittenberg University, Ohio, United States.



Huang Kexin [7806 0668 0207]--son of Huang Yan [7806 5888] (deputy director of the State Meteorological Administration, State Council.) Illinois State University, United States.

Jian Sijin [7415 1835 6651]--son of Jian Sanqiang [7415 0005 1730]. PhD candidate in physics, Illinois Institute of Technology, United States.

Geng Yan [5105 3601]--daughter of Geng Biao [5105 7374]. Harvard University, United States.

Tian Xiaobing [3944 2556 0393]--daughter of Xu Shiyu [6079 0013 0645] and his wife surnamed Tian. University of California at Los Angeles, United States.

Liu Xiaoyuan [0491 1420 0337]--daughter-in-law of Deng Xiaoping. Deng Zhifang's wife. Biology Department, University of Rochester, United States.

Chen Mingming [7115 2494 2494]--daughter of the mayor of Harbin. Tufts University, Massachusetts, United States.

Fu Li [0265 4539]--son of Fu Zuoyi [0265 0155 5030]. Temple University, Pennsylvania, United States.

12581

CSO: 4005/135

ROLE OF PARTY MEMBERS IN BUILDING SPIRITUAL CIVILIZATION

Beijing BANYUE TAN [SEMIMONTHLY TALKS] in Chinese No 20, 25 Oct 86 pp 7-8

[Article by Xia Liyuan [1115 0448 3220]: "The Role of Party Members in Building a Spiritual Civilization"]

[Text] The "Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society With an Advanced Culture and Ideology," adopted by the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee, is a programmatic document for stepping up the building of a socialist spiritual civilization in China. It certainly will have a great and far-reaching impact on promoting the all-around reform, opening to the outside world and building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The guiding principles have been clarified for building a spiritual civilization. The problem now is to study and implement them conscientiously. Communist party members in particular should earnestly practice what they advocate and lead the way in building a spiritual civilization.

To do this, it is necessary first of all to seriously study the "resolution," grasp its essence, and really understand the strategic importance of building a spiritual civilization. At present, some party members, including leading cadres, mistakenly think that the production of material goods is real and indispensable, and that the building of a spiritual civilization is something hollow and unimportant. They fail to see that the building of a spiritual civilization will raise the ideological and ethical standards and the educational and scientific levels of the whole nation, which, in turn, will give spiritual impetus and intellectual support to the development of a materialist civilization. This is an indispensable condition for the success of socialist modernization. We cannot achieve material progress without cultural and ideological development. Therefore, we must, through studying the "resolution," firmly establish the idea of building the two civilizations simultaneously. We must also help the masses around us understand the importance of building a spiritual civilization and work together with us to build it.

To play an exemplary vanguard role in building a spiritual civilization, communist party members must strive to improve their own ideological, political and cultural standards. This calls for us to step up our efforts to temper our party spirit and strengthen our communist ideals and belief. Party members should stand in the forefront of reform and serve the people wholeheartedly. To set an example for the masses, we must ourselves become well-educated and self-disciplined citizens with lofty ideals and moral integrity.

To build a spiritual civilization, communist party members must strive to acquire scientific and general knowledge and improve their practical ability to take part in the modernization drive. The development of education, science and culture is an important aspect of the building of a spiritual civilization. To take part in building a spiritual civilization, a concrete step a communist party member can take is to diligently study and acquire scientific and general knowledge. At present, our party members' educational and scientific levels are rather low, far from meeting the requirements for building the two civilizations. This situation must be changed as quickly as possible. The acquisition of scientific and general knowledge is a serious task to which we must attach great importance.

Whether communist party members can play an exemplary vanguard role in building a spiritual civilization is an important indication of whether the party enjoys high prestige and whether its leadership is strong and effective. Party members are the hard core in the endeavor to build the two civilizations. They must use their own words and deeds to influence, unite and lead the masses in waging a common struggle. They should set an example in working hard, studying diligently and making progress, in doing solid work instead of indulging in empty talk, in persisting in carrying out reforms and boldly bringing forth new ideas and blazing new trails. They should also set an example in supporting the poor and helpless and leading and helping the masses in getting rich through hard work, and in observing law and discipline and daring to wage struggles against unhealthy trends and criminal activities. They should be leaders in building a spiritual civilization with their own exemplary words and deeds, organizing and pushing forward the development of the socialist spiritual civilization by society as a whole.

12802/12859

CSO: 4005/259

# YEAR-END APPRAISAL OF CONTROL YUAN'S PERFORMANCE

Taipei TZULI WANPAO in Chinese 31 Dec 86 p 2

[By correspondent Yang Hsien-ts'un [2799 2009 2625]: "Silent as in the Past; Doing the Same Old Thing All Over; When Will the Control Yuan Bestir Itself From Its State of Lethargy and Get Away From Its Evil Practices?"]

[Text] The annual general review meeting of the Control Yuan hastily concluded its meeting a few days ago, after having gone through a 3-week procedure of reviewing the Control Yuan's performance in the past year. Perhaps they had nothing good and no actual achievements to report, so they also did not arouse general interest. The only topic that somewhat evoked a debate happened to be the bribery scandal in connection with the election of Control Yuan delegates themselves, which of course had little positive effect on improving the current image or morale of the Control Yuan.

This year's general review meeting was more apathetic than in previous years, mainly because the greatly increased number of delegates were facing next term elections and seeking reelection. Most delegates skimmed along at the meeting "like dragon flies over the surface of water," merely going superficially through the motions, and after a day of attendance rushed back to their home districts to make arrangements for the coming election, while the more senior delegates either did not utter a word or acted as mere yes-men, so that the whole meeting was exceptionally indifferent and lackluster.

Another reason was that the various work reports submitted for discussion at the general review meeting had neither substance nor novelty. The delegates also seemed to pay little attention to their review function; most items on the agenda were passed as proposed without any discussion at all. Especially the "review opinions on common political measures," which by their nature represent the achievements and conclusions of comprehensive deliberations, appeared even more like empty dogmatic articles without substance. Liu Yen-t'ao [0491 1693 3447] derided them as "containing nothing that was not already reported in the newspapers or what has not already been the subject of discussions among scholars and specialists." If this type of review opinions is submitted to the Executive Yuan for corrective measures, it will of course arouse little interest in the executive sector.

During this year, the Control Yuan received 5,962 petitions from citizens, of which 206 were accepted for investigation and 3,416 were filed for reference. This made delegate Ts'ai Hsiao-i [5591 1321 5030] complain that the office staff had too much power, since the petitions from the people, as soon as they reach the Control Yuan, are all sent to the Office for Checking and Approval, where office staff can mark them "file for reference" and put them away, before they are submitted for action to the delegates. Actually, this is not a new complaint or expression of regret. After so many years, delegates of the Control Yuan have become too accustomed to call this matter into question. Delegate Chin Yueh-kuang [6855 6390 0342] admits that several years ago, he had demanded that serious attention should be paid to this situation, lest the Control Yuan be called a "File-For-Reference Yuan."

What is even more saddening is that among the 5,000 to 6,000 petitions from citizens received this year by the Control Yuan not even 5 percent can count on corrective measures and relief. The common people are left with no place to voice their grievances; their complaints are as good as never having been expressed. This is not only a problem of officials arrogating powers to themselves, but a problem of having a Control Yuan that is no more capable of functioning and that has lost its basic ability to respond to or be entrusted with the will of the people. Delegate Chang Tun-hua [1728 2415 5478], elected by overseas Chinese, directly expressed it when he said that the crux of the whole problem is the inability of the Control Yuan itself to fulfill its duties.

In the ongoing debate during the 3 weeks of the meeting, apart from good old zealous senior delegate Yuan Ch'ing-hui [5913 2532 2547] submitting a long, long document in criticism of current political affairs and Sung Ying [1545 5391], who had once spoken in 1983, and could not help "repeating a few honest words," what attracted greatest attention was that delegate Chang Ping-chih [1728 4426 2535], a native of Mongolia, unexpectedly gave a speech. Though he only spoke mainly in support of another delegate's speech, he was said to have not spoken for at least 6 years, some say 10 years, and some older employees say that it was at least 20 years that anyone had heard him speak in the Control Yuan; there was for a time quite some differences of opinions. This shows that the state of general silence in the Control Yuan has reached a serious stage where everybody is surprised if a man suddenly speaks up.

Then again, speaking of the election bribery, the topic that was debated the most, the hall resounded with speeches of the delegates. At the end, a token resolution was passed to write a letter to the competent authorities to deal with the matter according to law, but outwardly the show of the senior delegates criticizing the newly added delegates neither produced any specific control method nor did it do anything to raise the general morale within the Control Yuan, on the contrary it only added to the regret felt by everybody.

It is precisely as some of the old delegates sorrowfully feel every year at the year end general review meetings, namely that whatever should have been said has already been said who knows how many times. The delegates said whatever they wanted to say and the government, regardless of it, did whatever

it wanted to do, finally everybody became tired of talking, and felt it best to lapse into an indifferent silence. This year's annual meeting appeared even more apathetic; it was a scene of desolation, a miserable and dreary scene, much as a forest of defoliated trees.

9808

CSO: 4005/386

ATTITUDINAL SURVEY RESULTS ON RECENT CONTROL YUAN ELECTIONS

Taipei TZULI WANPAO in Chinese 8 Jan 87 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Opinion Poll by This Paper on the Expanded Election of Members to the Control Yuan; Interviews With Provincial and Municipal Assembly Delegates; Most Delegates Point Out that Limited Joint List Election is Ineffective in Blocking Election Bribery, Also Regard it as Unfair to Candidates From Minority Parties"]

[Excerpts] Taipei--To gain an understanding of the views of the present provincial and municipal assembly delegates on the election of delegates to the Control Yuan, this paper arranged a poll by means of questionnaires, from 29 December 1986 to 6 January 1987 this year, among Taiwan provincial delegates and delegates from Taipei and Kaohsiung municipalities. Correspondents of this paper were handling the poll by questionnaire either by personal interviews, telephone interviews, or by sending the questionnaires and requesting their completion. The method was anonymous throughout. Altogether 111 valid questionnaires were returned, 50 from provincial assembly delegates, 41 from Taipei and 20 from Kaohsiung municipal delegates.

Of the questionnaires actually received, 77.5 percent were from male, 22.5 percent from female delegates. By parties: 71.2 percent were Kuomintang, 18 percent Democratic Progressive Party, 10.8 percent unaffiliated. By level of education: 16.5 percent from research institutes, 42.2 percent from universities, 41.3 percent from professional training colleges and senior middle schools. By ages: 1.8 percent aged 23 to 30, 27.3 percent aged 31 to 40, 42.7 percent aged 41 to 50, 28.2 percent aged 51 to 60.

Questionnaire on Views Regarding the 1986 Expanded Election of Delegates to the Control Yuan

1. What do you think is the most desirable quality in a person to be elected to the Control Yuan:
  - (1) High level of education: 8.1 percent;
  - (2) Personal moral integrity: 73.9 percent;
  - (3) Ability: 16.2 percent;
  - (4) Political Viewpoint: 1.8 percent;
  - (5) Other: 0.



2. What was your main consideration for choosing a candidate:
  - (1) Constraint of party discipline: 22 percent;
  - (2) Outer appearance of candidate: 68.8 percent;
  - (3) Direct or indirect connection (friend, relative-introduced, etc.): 8.3 percent;
  - (4) Price offered by candidate: 0;
  - (5) Others; 0.9 percent.
3. According to your knowledge, was bribery involved in this year's election of any candidate to the Control Yuan:
  - (1) There was: 31.8 percent;
  - (2) There was not: 26.4 percent;
  - (3) Don't know: 41.8 percent.
4. Have you personally come into contact with election bribery (has anyone contacted you with the intention of election bribery?):
  - (1) There has been such (also answer items 5 and 6): 16.4 percent;
  - (2) There has been none (go on to item 6): 76.4 percent;
  - (3) Inappropriate to respond (go on to item 6): 7.3 percent.
5. The party who contacted you was:
  - (1) A candidate himself/herself: 72.2 percent;
  - (2) A fellow-delegate: 5.6 percent;
  - (3) Others: 22.2 percent.
6. If and when approached, your attitude would be:
  - (1) Considering giving him/her the vote: 4 percent;
  - (2) Tactfully urge him not to engage in election bribery, without necessarily giving him/her the vote: 43.6 percent;
  - (3) Not giving him/her the vote: 39.6 percent;
  - (4) Others: 12.9 percent.
7. Do you believe secret ballots with limited joint lists of candidates is an effective measure against election bribery?
  - (1) Very effective: 4.6 percent;
  - (2) Effective: 27.8 percent;
  - (3) Not effective: 52.8 percent;
  - (4) Don't know/no opinion: 14.8 percent.
8. Do you believe secret ballot with limited joint lists of candidates is fair to minority parties?
  - (1) Very fair: 0.9 percent;
  - (2) Fair: 24.3 percent;
  - (3) Unfair: 30.8 percent;
  - (4) Very unfair: 22.4 percent;
  - (5) Don't know/no opinion: 21.5 percent.

9. Are you in favor of secret ballots with limited joint lists of candidates for the election of Control Yuan delegates?
- (1) Very much in favor: 5.5 percent;
  - (2) In favor: 35.5 percent;
  - (3) Not in favor: 30.6 percent;
  - (4) Very much opposed: 17.3 percent;
  - (5) Don't know/no opinion: 11.8 percent.
10. Are you in favor of reverting to secret ballot with single listing of candidates for the election of Control Yuan delegates?
- (1) Very much in favor: 14.7 percent;
  - (2) In favor: 34.9 percent;
  - (3) Not in favor: 33 percent;
  - (4) Very much opposed: 2.8 percent;
  - (5) Don't know/no opinion: 14.7 percent.
11. What would you think is the only way to prevent bribery in the election of delegates to the Control Yuan?
- (1) Strict investigations: 4.6 percent;
  - (2) Strengthening party discipline: 17.4 percent;
  - (3) Self-restraint of delegates: 21.1 percent;
  - (4) Change of election method: 15.6 percent;
  - (5) Nominating honest and upright candidates: 34.9 percent;
  - (6) Other ways (please specify): 6.4 percent.
12. Which, in your opinion, is the ideal method of electing delegates to the Control Yuan?
- (1) Direct popular election: 37.3 percent;
  - (2) A system of quotas in proportion to political parties (sending delegates according to the proportion of their seats in the assemblies): 19.1 percent;
  - (3) Indirect election (also answer item 13): 40.9 percent;
  - (4) No opinion: 2.7 percent.
13. If you are in favor of indirect election, which, in your opinion, would be the ideal method:
- (1) Secret ballot with single listing of delegates: 32.6 percent;
  - (2) Secret ballot with limited joint lists of candidates: 60.5 percent;
  - (3) Other methods (please specify): 7 percent.

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CSO: 4005/386

# DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY'S VIEW ON NATIONAL SECURITY LAW

Taipei TZULI WANPAO in Chinese 31 Dec 86 p 2

[Text] Some members of the Democratic Progressive Party [DPP] elected to the Legislative Yuen found many problems in the draft of the National Security Law [NSL], published by the central government of the party in power. Furthermore, many pointed out that the legislative policy in drafting the bill had been disorderly and confused, and that its legislative technique was inferior, so that effective enforcement of the law could hardly be expected.

The following are the major points of their statements:

Chiang P'eng-chien [3068 7720 1017], chairman of the DPP: "As to legislative technique, some articles in the NSL draft overlap with the functions of other laws, terms used are ambiguous and abstract, and its order of precedence is also not clear. Legislative technique must be declared rather inferior, and many difficulties will possibly arise in the future enforcement of the law.

Speaking of Article 2, the constitution mainly restricts the powers of the government and guarantees the rights of the citizens; political proposals made by the people should then be received with even greater respect. The constitution itself is also not immune from amendments. Where is the yardstick to measure, in concrete terms, what is meant by "must not violate the constitution"? How can we ask people to observe this kind of legislation that violates basic principles of law and is so vague in its terminology?

In Article 3, there is no reason to deprive the Taiwanese of their right to return to their native places. On its promulgation, this law will immediately be found to be in obvious violation of relevant international conventions and will be denounced by international public opinion.

For the transitional period from the state of emergency to the lifting of emergency, it is my belief that the authorities in power should carefully formulate specific measures to dissolve unnecessary organs, and amend or abolish the decrees of the emergency period. This alone would be the fundamental way to solve the problem.

Yu Ch'ing [1429 3237], member of the Control Yuan: "The legislative policy in drafting the NSL is confused, and its legislative technique is inferior. Judging by the text of the published bill, the law could not properly fulfil its functions:

1. As to the confused state of legislative policy, Article 1 of the bill explicitly prescribes that the objective of the legislation is "to ensure the security of the state and ensure social stability." For the purpose of "state security," we have not only the penal code, but also such special legal provisions as the "Regulations for the Suppression of Sedition," "Regulations for the Investigation and Elimination of Gangsters," etc. From the standpoint of democratic constitutional government, it would appear not only unnecessary to formulate a NSL, but would still make it necessary to amend or abolish the said two special regulations.

As to "ensuring social stability," work should start here in the area of social welfare. The reason why we have so many social problems now is that we have not yet established a social security system.

2. As to the legislative technique, the draft of the NSL violates legislative and economic principles and the principle of logical consistency. Provisions at the start and at the end do not dovetail, as if it were just so much patchwork. There is no necessary connection between the purpose of the legislation stated in Article 1 and the provisions of Article 2 to Article 9, and there are, furthermore, many articles with provisions that are already contained in other laws. For instance, the provision that nonmilitary persons do not fall under military jurisdiction is already contained in Article 9 of the constitution and in Article 1 of the "Law Governing Military Tribunals." On the matter of handling cases of the military tribunals after the lifting of an emergency, the emergency law already has provisions, and there is no need for further legislation in the NSL.

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4005/386

INTERVIEW WITH DPP CHAIRMAN CHIANG P'ENG-CHIEN

Hong Kong CHIUSHIH NIENTAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese No 204, Jan 87 pp 44-45

[Interview with Chiang P'eng-chien [3068 7720 1017] member Legislative Yuan and chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party by Lin Ssu [2651 1835] on 8-9 December in Taipei: "Chiang P'eng-chien: 'Self-Determination' Is a Means Not an End"; first paragraph is source-supplied introduction]

[Excerpts] Editor's note: The 1986 central election in Taiwan was particularly spectacular. After the election, this magazine interviewed Chiang P'eng-chien, chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party [DPP]. The interview took place on 8 and 9 December in Taipei.

Question: First, please assess the results of this election.

Answer: In this election, there was a marked growth for the DPP, both in the number of votes and the number of seats it got. Its seats in the Legislative Yuan increased to 12 from 6, and its seats in the National Assembly increased to 11 from 5, showing that it has obtained the support of the general populace. Especially after the occurrence of the airliner reception incident, on the one hand, we canceled the originally scheduled all-province roving meetings to explain the new party; on the other hand, the Kuomintang [KMT] set in motion a large number of the mass media, which put all the responsibility for this incident on the DPP in order to distort and smear the new party's image. Both of these things were unfavorable to a new party. Relying only on the final 2 or 3 days, we used limited nonparty financial resources and forms to counterattack. For example, we printed leaflets and held explanation meetings. The results we were able to get we consider barely satisfactory. Here, there is a point that made the deepest impression on me, namely, even though the KMT coerced such powerful mass media to "surround and annihilate" the DPP, it caused a backlash. On the one hand, it shows that the populace's public trust in the mass media is lacking; on the other hand, it shows the degree of maturity in the political understanding of our voters, which already surpasses that of the government. The "surround and annihilate" campaign made people think of the Kaohsiung incident 7 years ago, and they then proceeded to the next step of secretly worrying about political persecution. This is an optimistic side of what I saw in the election.

Question: For the first time a candidate recommended by the Huang Fu-hsing party headquarters (the military) lost an election, and for the first time the professional organizations had DPP candidates taking part in party elections (three). What are your views on these things?

Answer: In the past, military dependent villages were sources of certain votes for the KMT. In recent years, because of a gradual opening up, the village population has become highly mobile, and the villages are no longer closed societies. It is very difficult to force them to vote for whatever person the KMT wants them to vote for. In addition, the laboring people's families and the special life households are slowly being destroyed. Viewed from the aspect of democratic politics, this is a good phenomenon. The elections of the professional organizations, frankly speaking, greatly exceeded the DPP's expectations. I think there were two reasons for this. First, in accordance with the stipulations of the "election and recall law," the voters must specially make their wishes clear, indicating that they want to cast their ballots in regional elections; otherwise, without exception, they will be incorporated into a professional organization (in the past, the candidates of the professional organizations were monopolized by the KMT). The KMT used this point to play a trick. The voters who did not go through the proper procedures for making clear their wishes lost or let slip the opportunity to make clear their wishes, causing universal disgust. Second, the cost of Taiwan's economic development in the past several decades has been cheap labor, but the government does not attach importance to its labor policy. In addition, the labor unions are controlled by the KMT, and it is impossible for them to fully reflect the workers' opinions, causing strong dissatisfaction among union members. The results of this election reflected this dissatisfaction. In fact, many voters basically had never heard the names of the DPP's candidates. The votes the voters gave them were not an affirmation of them as individuals, but were an acceptance of the DPP and a rejection of the KMT.

These two things provided the KMT with unusually good material to ponder: once the intelligence of the people has been set free and the trend of the times has changed, to do things in accordance with the blocking and monopolizing attitude of the past will only lead to relatively unfavorable consequences.

Question: How will the DPP play a role in the legislature in the future?

Answer: The Legislative Yuan now has a total of 323 members. The DPP, if Fei Hsi-p'ing [6316 1585 1627] is counted, only has 13 seats. Even if they act in unity, in voting decisions it is impossible for them to achieve a curbing effect. They cannot even make a draft resolution (by the rules, 20 or more persons are needed). So I think there are two ways they can do things. First, they can unite and create pressure, and then through talks fight for the interests of the masses. Second, if the KMT uses force to stop discussion and forces a decision by voting, the DPP members can display the passive function of disseminating information to society, thereby forming pressure from public opinion and the masses, which will redound on the Legislative Yuan and create yet another kind of pressure on the KMT.

Question: Please discuss the question of conformity and discipline within the DPP!

Answer: First, I'll discuss conformity. Many people are influenced by the exaggerations spread by the KMT agents. They think that outside the party there are always "mountain strongholds" and great numbers of factions. Actually, the situation is not that serious. In the past we did not have a powerful political party and organization. If an individual had political ambitions, it was difficult for him to avoid mustering some forces and forming a so-called "mountain stronghold" and faction. Now we have a party, and everybody can, within this party, jointly recognize, discuss, and handle some things, achieving as much coordination as possible. Even if there are different opinions, it is a major premise of a democratic society to recognize that every person can have different opinions, and there is nothing strange or special about this. I myself am quite optimistic that there will be conformity in work.

As for discipline, before the party was founded some people proposed that we form a political party of a pliant nature, like the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States, in which discipline is fairly lax and the party member structure in disorder. However, later we felt that the situations in Taiwan and the United States are different. Both of the American parties are of a pliant nature. What the DPP faces on Taiwan is a party that in nature originated from a revolutionary party, and its organization and discipline are strict and rigid. It is even a superrigid party. To try to contend with it, we had to make some adjustments. We pay much attention to the safeguarding of party discipline. Once there is a violation of discipline, we hand the case over to the independent central appraisal commission for handling. This commission requires the person concerned to reply to the charge and justify himself, after which it reaches a decision.

Question: Recently I heard several public employees, who formerly belonged to the nonparty cause and now have not yet joined the new party, say that the reason they have not joined is that they have misgivings about the Organization and Unity Society, and that they also have doubts about its pursuing rational concepts in party politics. Will the Organization and Unity Society and the Public and Political Affairs Society cause problems in the future?

Answer: Most members of the DPP came from the former nonparty secondary organizations, like the Public and Political Affairs Society, Organization and Unity Society, and Unity and Friendship Society, as well as from nonparty friendship organizations, such as the Society for Support of the Labor Law, Society for Promotion of the Taiwan People's Rights, and so forth. However, the new party is not a coalition of these organizations, and it changes the status of society members. With the new party being set up not long ago, there may be someone who looks on from the sidelines or someone who is unwilling to join it. We respect this opinion.

As for whether the lines of the Public and Political Affairs Society and the Organization and Unity Society are too different, I feel that this is an unnecessary worry. This is because most members of the Public and Political



Affairs Society are public employees and the Organization and Unity Society does general party work. Their fields of work are, of course, different. The former can be compared to the KMT Policy Society and the latter to its Cultural Society. In addition, in parliamentary work it is difficult for public employees to avoid showing a tendency toward compromise. The personnel of the Organization and Unity Society, when engaging in political and mass movements, have few taboos, so they look fairly radical. However, after they work in a common organization (party), they quickly understand each other's position. Looking at the situation in the past 2 or 3 months, there have not been any big difficulties. What's more, many people of the Organization and Unity Society are now taking part in elections, and I believe the problems will become fewer and fewer.

Question: Now that there is a party what will be the orientation of the secondary organizations? Will local party headquarters be set up?

Answer: Not necessarily. As I have just said, the DPP is not a big coalition, and with the change in some of its members, it has transcended the original system. With regard to theory, if the party works well, there is no value in the existence of the secondary organizations. However, we will respect their ideas about whether to disband them or not. In principle, we think that if they can be disbanded they should be disbanded, and then everybody will make common efforts under one banner. If it is concluded that they cannot be disbanded, then we hope they will be able to change their functions. Otherwise, if they still maintain their present political activities, they will easily give people the false impression that there are two antagonistic organizations.

Question: Was the effect of the Hsu Hsin-liang [1776 0207 5328] airliner reception incident on this election positive or negative?

Answer: Not everybody's view is the same. Although the election lasted only 15 days there were too many variables in it, and it is very difficult to correctly estimate the incident's effect. My personal view is that if there had been no airliner reception incident, the original complete set of plans to help the election would have had to be carried out, and the achievement could have been even more ideal. However, speaking about his return, if Hsu Hsin-liang wants to return, we respect his wish and we strive for the right of Taiwan people to return to Taiwan. This is not just his affair, but is a problem that has existed for a long time. Therefore, although the DPP's image could be somewhat damaged because of this affair, it succeeded in bringing into prominence the human rights theme that Taiwan people cannot return to Taiwan, mainland people cannot return to the mainland, and aboriginal people of the reservations in the mountain areas of Taiwan cannot return to the reservations.

Question: The part of the DPP program concerning "self-determination for the inhabitants of Taiwan" could be stretched to the question of the consciousness of separation. How do you see it?

Answer: It is the result of KMT exaggeration. Actually, there is an important background factor to this article in the program, namely, the

structure of the parliament makes it impossible for it to fully reflect the will of the people. If today's parliament were completely reelected, it would be fairly difficult for this kind of appeal to get a sympathetic response. In other words, this is an appeal of a means nature, not an appeal of an end nature. We hope, through this form of completely respecting the wishes of the inhabitants to arrive at a solution of the Taiwan problem. As for what in the end the solution of the Taiwan problem will be, no one yet knows the answer. The government has the government's propaganda slogan of a "China united under the three people's principles"; the nongovernmental scholars have the different position of "the German model, the Greater China Commonwealth, and the Singapore model"; and there is even the "one country, two systems" proposed by Deng Xiaoping. If now the procedures for self-determination were decided by voting, we cannot say for certain that the result would be to support the government in uniting China with the three people's principles. Only through justice can substantial justice be obtained. By drawing an equal sign between the means of self-determination and the end of Taiwan independence, the KMT sedulously distorts the DPP's practices.

Question: Finally, please discuss the long-range and short-range goals for the future development of the DPP.

Answer: The DPP is a political party, and the goal of all political parties is to be the party in power. However, under the present circumstances in which there has not yet been a change in the entire political structure (I think that it is impossible for any "election" in Taiwan to be a true election, and I call it a test of the popular will, because the number of "elections" do not effect the replacement of the regime, but only test the popular will), the populace looks forward to our role. We could either tip the balance or not let some other party come to power. However, we ourselves must advance toward the long-range goal of being able to take power. We must work hard to get close to the masses, train cadres, and improve the cadres' capability for querying the government and for taking power.

Playing a greater role in tipping the balance is our short-range goal. Attaining power is our final goal and our long-range goal.

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COMPARISON OF KMT, DPP CHARTERS, PROGRAMS

Hong Kong CHIUSHIH NIENTAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese No 203, Dec 86 pp 71-72

[Article by Nan Min [0589 3046]: "What Kind of Party or Power There Is Determined What Kind of Opposition Party There Is; Discussion of the Constitutions of the Two Parties"]

[Text] Comparing the constitutions of the "Democratic Progressive Party [DPP]" and the Kuomintang [KMT], the similarities of the two can be seen. They both have the characteristics of being a "mixture of democratic and centralist," but the democratic nature of the new party is clearly greater than that of the KMT.

The constitution and program of the "DPP" were adopted at the first national congress of party members. What is most important if one wants to understand a political party is to look at its constitution and program. From a look at the constitution and program of the "DPP" it can be seen that the Western adage "what kind of party in power there is determines what kind of opposition party there is" really is an irrefutable truth.

They Are Parties With "Both Democracy and Centralism"

In things that are opposite each other, the two are opposites but also have a regular "mutual permeability," (mutual-penetration), and thus there emerges the "similarity of opposites." Comparing the DPP's constitution and program with the KMT's constitution and political program, we see that there is this kind of "similarity of opposites." First, we can discuss the content of the two constitutions.

The organization of the KMT is of the 5-tier system: central; province (cities directly under the province); county and city; township, town, and city district; and group. This is the organization of a big party of a "national nature." Although the Chinese Republic now only has jurisdiction over Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, Quemoy, and Matsu, and the nation and the province are practically the same in meaning, the KMT from first to last has insisted on its "national nature" and thus in party organization it insists on the 5-tier system. However, the DPP is not like this. On the one hand, it is a small party. On the other hand, it is a fairly realistic party. There is no need for it to set up groups, and there is also no need for it to rigidly set up a false provincial level. Thus the CPC only has three levels: central; county and city; and township, town, and city district. Even though

in the parties there is the difference of five levels and three levels, they belong to the party model of "having both democracy and centralism," and are essentially similar.

Again talking about the relationships and structure of authority shown in the DPP's constitution, at every level it makes the party members or the party member's congress the mechanism of highest authority. The executive committee at each level is the executive mechanism, and the approval committee at each level is the approval mechanism. At the central level, the DPP has set up a Central Executive Committee composed of 31 members, who were directly elected by the national congress of party members. Their term is 1 year, and they may hold their posts for another term after being reelected. The Executive Committee members elect 11 persons to be Standing Committee members, who jointly consult. Their term is 1 year and they may hold their posts for another term after being reelected. In addition, the members of the Central Executive Committee elect one of the Standing Committee members to be chairman. His term is 1 year, and he may not be reelected to another term. This organizational framework of the DPP's is quite close to that of the KMT: central committee members--central standing committee members--chairman. The only difference is that the terms of the DPP's Executive Committee members, Standing Committee members, and chairman are fairly short. This shows that the democratic nature of the DPP is greater than that of the KMT. The DPP is a new small political party. It naturally needs a more democratic nature.

The DPP also imitates the KMT in that there are appraisal committee members at all levels, but the KMT's appraisal committee members are appointed while the DPP's are elected. Comparing the two systems, the DPP's system of appraisal committee members is naturally more democratic and more authoritative.

Comparing the DPP's and KMT's constitutions, the similarity between the two can be seen. Because the KMT has an enormous organization--there are 2 million party members--the degree of its inner-party democracy is inferior to that of the DPP, which consists of 1,300 to 1,400 persons. However, the two parties basically have the style of a "party that is a mixture of a mobilization party and a democratic party." They also both have the characteristic of being a "mixture of democracy and democratic centralism." In future development, when these two parties deal with each other, if they can follow the democratic style, the democratic natures of the two sides will strengthen each other. As for the DPP, it is now a "federation-type party" with many factions. No matter whether based on the needs of internal or external competition, it must maintain a relatively high degree of internal democracy. However, what its constitution shows is a "mixed-type party," and it has an aspect of democratic centralism. Therefore, from a look at the long-term developments, in the end the DPP will face the same plight as the KMT--"wavering between revolution and democracy" and "wavering between inner-party democracy and inner-party centralism."

#### World Development: the Theory of Convergence

Modern democratic countries, especially the political parties of democratic countries, like public activity organizations, face the difficult problem of the cunning nature and dialectical development respectively of charismatic

leaders and democratic self-initiative. This difficult problem is especially evident in backward countries, where many political parties that flaunt the banner of democracy on the contrary cannot even have inner-party democracy. The KMT is an example. The DPP, which is independent of the KMT, because it has both a "mobilization nature" and a "democratic nature," in its future work should be especially careful about engaging in intimidation.

In the political parties of all modern countries, except for those that have lost their internal democracy, there is another trend, namely, the political programs of the various parties become more and more similar to each other. In the countries on the European and American continents, the traditional "Christian democratic parties" and the "social democratic parties," in their tactics on many political and economic questions, are becoming less and less different. Nationalism and internationalism become mixed, and the free economy and the planned economy become intertwined. In political thought this is called the "theory of convergence." Comparing the party program of the DPP and the political program of the KMT, except for the differences in the political aspects, their positions on other affairs are quite similar--the two are of the "mixed type" and their ultimate goal is the "welfare state."

Generally speaking, the political program or party program of a political party for the most part is a political position of the "international type." In a modern country, because of a lot of routine work, a single ideology is no longer effective, and the political programs or party programs are becoming more and more mixed, more and more similar. The picture of a perfect society is written in the KMT's political program, and the opposition DPP's party program is no exception.

#### Principal Points of Divergence in Politics

The only true differences between the KMT and the DPP are on political questions; the evident and major ones are:

First, the DPP advocates that "Taiwan's future should be decided by all inhabitants of Taiwan." It opposes "the subjugation by armed force in international politics of the political entities of disputed, divided countries." It states that "no government or government coalition has the authority to decide the political jurisdiction over Taiwan." As for the question of the two sides of the strait, it says that "priority efforts should be made to improve the lives of the people on the two sides, and a tense confrontation should not be created." It "opposes the form of decisions by talks between the Nationalists and Communists based on the violation of the principle of people's self-determination." From a look at these articles in its party program, we see that the DPP has inherited some ideas of separatism, but their coloring has been much toned down, and there is the eclectic flavor of "people's self-determination" and "reforms to conserve Taiwan." Furthermore, it is a kind of "passive self-determination," not an "active self-determination." Also, the DPP demands a "return to the constitutional foundation." In this sense, it opposes the relevant "provisional articles" and the laws and systems of the "extraordinary times." What the DPP demands is a free, democratic system without the traditional encumbrances of the KMT.

Third, the DPP affirms the importance of grassroots democracy and grassroots culture. Therefore, in its system, starting from full local autonomy it goes on to respect the native culture.

By comprehensively comparing the political program and the party program of the KMT and the DPP, we can see by bringing out the essentials that the basic difference is that one is an "extraordinary system" and the other is a "constitutional system." The former maintains that Taiwan is still in "extraordinary times" and still expects to "unite China with the three people's principles," and therefore it calls on the citizens to exercise patience and wait. The latter maintains that KMT is trying by means of the "extraordinary times" to control political power forever, and therefore the latter advocates taking another path. However, even with this kind of difference we cannot say that the DPP is a party that advocates separatism. In the final analysis, what it has declared is only the idea of "passive self-determination." Whether Taiwan wants independence and whether Taiwan can get independence are either/or questions. In the international environment, present-day Taiwan is becoming less and less able to get an opportunity for independence. Since Taiwan cannot be independent, the reaction to the "passive self-determination" is: 1) they are not in sympathy with the state goals of the KMT regime; 2) they are likewise suspicious of the state goals of the Chinese communists; and 3) to a certain degree at least they are still satisfied with Taiwan's situation, and there is quite a lot of resistance to the Chinese Communists.

#### The "DPP" Will Not Be a Radical Party

When drafting its party program, the DPP had quite a lot of controversy. The original plan drafted by the young radicals faction had an extremely strong "Taiwan local consciousness," and included advocating that the Southern Fujian dialect be made the legal language. After repeated discussion, these parochial "local consciousnesses" were all deleted. Some comparatively rational views were retained. From this it can also be seen that in the future it is not likely that the DPP will become a radical party. In recent years, the academic circles and the polling circles on Taiwan have taken many polls. They discovered that for the inhabitants of Taiwan, even if they yearned for democracy, the topic they were most concerned about was still the maintenance of the status quo and moderate improvements. This shows that Taiwan basically has sufficient social conditions for letting an "inner-establishment party" develop. A so-called "inner-establishment party" is a party that is formed by gradually assembling the politicians of opposition factions. It is an opposition faction, but it is an opposition faction composed of politicians with a sense of propriety. The DPP is now this kind of party. Its party constitution and party program are of a clearly mixed nature, and their specific ideology is not pure. Perhaps this is precisely the opposition party that Taiwan now needs! Perhaps this kind of moderate opposition party can make the KMT clear up its blurred state goals and take bigger strides to give Taiwan freedom and democracy.

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INTERVIEW WITH LIBERAL KMT LEGISLATIVE YUAN MEMBER-ELECT

Hong Kong CHIUSHI NIENTAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese No 204, Jan 87 pp 46-47

[Interview with Chao Shao-k'ang [6392 1421 1660] member Taipei City Council, and member-elect Legislative Yuan by Lin Ssu [2651 1835]: "The Kuomintang Needs a Major Reform"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Question: First, congratulations on your being elected as a member of the Legislative Yuan with the highest number of votes in Taipei City. Your political views, with the appeal that "the state needs to be thoroughly reformed, and the Kuomintang [KMT] needs to be transformed," have a distinctive image of reform. Contrasting this image, what meaning do you feel there was in your being elected with this high a number of votes?

Answer: I think there are two meanings. The first is that in the past 5 years my conduct in the city council has been affirmed by the populace. The voters do not just listen to what you say; they look at your contributions and record. Second, that there were this many of the populace who were this eagerly attentive to the call for reform means that the party in power really should make a good self-criticism: Why, with Taiwan's economic progress being this fast, do this many of the populace feel dissatisfied? In recent years, the Taiwan populace has had many opportunities to leave the country, and their progress in ideas is faster than that of the government. This is something that the party in power should be vigilant about.

Question: You advocate reform. However, the KMT, this mechanism of the state, is so large. After you enter the Legislative Yuan, with what specific plans and forms will you carry out your political views? Where will you start?

Answer: The Legislative Yuan is really more difficult than the City Council. All 51 members of the Taipei City Council were elected by the people. They do not dare to go against the will of the people. However, there are more than 300 senior members of the Legislature. Although they are devoted to the state, basically they are divorced from the will of the people. Naturally, we Legislative Yuan members who have been added to the roll will find it fairly difficult to play a role. However, I believe that the Legislative Yuan is a place where one can put forward arguments and do some things. As for what forms I will use, I think I will cooperate with some social movements, like



movements and polls on environmental protection and consumers. In addition, with the support of the forces of public opinion, I will put pressure on the Legislative Yuan, after which through observing, inquiring, and debating I will play my greatest role. I am now a member of the Environmental Committee of the Consumers Culture and Education Funds Society. Not long ago a Poll Funds Society was set up, and I hope to be able to conduct scientific polls on all major public policies, and make reports and suggestions to the government. I believe that by using these forms, I can make some big changes 3 to 6 years in the future. It will not do for the party in power not to change. With this reflection of the views of the populace, if it does not change it will deserve to worry about the situation in the next election.

Question: Have you thought that in the future within the Legislative Yuan you will encounter much resistance, a very great part of which will even come from the party in power that you belong to?

Answer: This can be expected, but the results (number of votes) of the election are very important. In this election, the KMT gave me very few votes, and at the outset I thought I would be under a big strain. Now I think things are all right. The more votes it might have given me, the more difficult it would be for me to do things in the future. The reason the Control Yuan cannot play its role is that whoever the KMT supports is elected and whoever it does not support is not elected. That in this election I was able to attract this many middle-of-the-road voters was a good thing, because in the future I can speak a little louder.

Question: Some people worry that if your criticism of the party in power and the current government is this sharp, in the future you could become a second Lei Yu-ch'i [7191 3254 7871] (he was originally a KMT member, but later his criticism of the government was too strong for the KMT to tolerate, and he was kicked out of the party). What do you think?

Answer: In timing, number of votes, and practices, Lei Yu-ch'i and I are alike. However, if you ask me the question of whether the KMT will accept my criticism, that depends on its breadth of mind and has nothing to do with me. I do the things I should do, and keep to the stand of the populace in striving for their rights and interests. The Chinese people have a fault, namely, they fear to offend others. If there is anything to fear it is not needing to do things.

Question: During the election, do you feel that the reporting slant and attitude of the Taiwan news media were obviously in favor of the party in power?

Answer: Speaking of the newspapers, they had already made great progress as compared with before, and in the future I believe they will become more and more open. However, there is much feeling of failure about the reporters on Taiwan. The demands put upon them by the news media system are often different from the journalism training that they received. This phenomenon is not too good. As for television, I think that, in addition to the meetings on public debates and political views that it should open up and hold, this medium should be fair and not mislead people; otherwise if you think you want

to help a certain person, the result will instead lead to aversion and cause the opposite effect.

Question: I think that many people would agree that in this election the "Democratic Progressive Party" [DPP] gained a small victory. Because of this some people worry that this result will provoke the conservatives within the KMT to rise up and that reforms like yours will be repressed.

Answer: I believe there will be resistance, but the possibility of being repressed is not large. I often think: what other path is there for Taiwan to take from that of becoming more democratic? There is none. Taiwan's future is tied to two sides: America's attitude and the growth or decline of the Chinese Communists' strength. On the American side, the most important thing is to let them know that we are a country that respects democracy. Likewise, with regard to the Chinese Communists, we must surpass them in economic and political systems. Democracy is a road on which there is no turning back. Today's era is different from the eras of Li Huan [2621 3562] and Wang Sheng [3769 2573]. The KMT certainly must think of ways to open up more; otherwise in the election 3 years from now, the DPP could get more than 40 percent of the votes.

Question: In this election the path of party politics was gradually taken, and the number of DPP members going into the Legislative Yuan doubled. What effects do you think this will have on the Legislative Yuan and on the future politics of Taiwan? What kind of adjustment should the Legislative Yuan make to deal with this situation?

Answer: Even if the DPP members in the Legislative Yuan display enough activity and unity, under the structure of the present political system it will be very hard for them to play a role--no matter how you dare to speak out, in the end the issue will still be decided by vote. However, it is undeniable that it will cause a great pounding and effect on the Legislative Yuan and that polarization will increase. For this reason, I think that a structural change is necessary. Only by reforming the basic structure of the parliament can an administrative reform be promoted. Recently, many people have paid a lot of attention to the parliament reform plan now being studied and drafted. I think this is a good beginning and is also a beginning worth affirming.

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END